


*Self and Society*  
NARCISSISM, COLLECTIVISM, AND THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF MORALS

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## 4 The Development of Personality, Narcissism, and Moral Judgment

THROUGHOUT PSYCHOLOGY'S BRIEF history the notion of "stages," invariant sequences of unfolding needs or competences, has been an integral part of theorizing about psychological development. The field's two most imposing intellectual figures, Freud and Piaget, both proposed stage theories, one of psychosexual, and the other of cognitive development.

In recent years psychologists have begun to wonder whether in fact the invariance and orderliness of stages is a property of the object of study or an artifact of the schema-building of the observer (see Flavell, 1971, 1982; Keil, 1981). Of course, it is both: science, like all human cognition, entails the imposition of categories of thought upon sensory experience to make it meaningful and manageable. It was Piaget's genius that allowed him to discern an orderly sequence in cognitive development, but he was surely constrained by the "facts" to put something like formal operations at the end and not at the beginning of that sequence.

When a theorist introduces a term such as stage, just as when he introduces a concept like "structure," he must be careful to delineate precisely what he means, so that the concept does not, like a malevolent spirit, live on beyond its usefulness, wreak havoc on those who make its acquaintance, and elude the grasp of even those who invoke it frequently. In this chapter I will, indeed, invoke this charmed metaphor in a way perhaps best described through another metaphor. The conception is of sequential sets of processes that shape current functioning much as a series of waves shapes a shoreline. As one wave recedes, the next submerges it, laps up against the shore, and remolds the landscape upon which the first left its mark. In other words, a set of processes will be seen on the horizon, will reach a crest, and will gradually recede, to be replaced by another.

Like all metaphors, this one has its limitations, which should be made explicit from the start to avoid misinterpretations. First, it cannot illustrate fixations or developmental arrests, in which a wave fails to recede in its proper time. Secondly, it does not accommodate regressions, in which

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previous waves return to the beach. Finally, the metaphor lacks an image of maturity, though it nicely illustrates the constant flow of experience that constitutes human life and perennially molds and remolds personality.

More formally, stages are sequentially organized ways of feeling, thinking, and behaving in the evolution of structures. In other words, they are waxing and waning methods of carrying out particular functions. To argue, as I did in Chapter 3, that certain control mechanisms develop from overt behaviors to intrapsychic transformations, is to say that the *method* for fulfilling the *function* of affect-regulation changes from action (e.g., for sitting on one's hands) to thought (e.g., thinking about something else). At younger ages the child will rely primarily on the former, while at older ages he will use a combination of the two; and if mental strategies fail, he will resort once again to behaviors.

The aim of this chapter is to enunciate a theory of personality development, one that draws on the rich clinical and theoretical understanding developed over several decades by psychoanalytic clinicians as well as the growing empirical literature on child development that has enriched our knowledge of the way children think, feel, and behave. The chapter will begin with a discussion of current approaches to the development of narcissism and object relations, moral judgment, and ego processes, and will then show how a synthesis of these perspectives and recent research can paint a fuller picture of personality development.

### The Development of Narcissism, Moral Judgment, and Ego Processes: Current Perspectives

A brief discussion of a persistent and growing problem in psychoanalytic theory provides a useful introduction to current perspectives on personality development. Classical psychoanalysis is a theory of drives and their vicissitudes, which argues that personality development is synonymous with psychosexual development. Since the 1940s, psychoanalytic theorists have been steadily recognizing the importance of understanding ego development and the development of object relations, and it has become increasingly clear that the latter aspects of maturation cannot be understood in psychosexual terms, however interlocked they may be. (For a staid presentation of the history of this state of affairs and the inconsistent assumptions held by drive theorists and object relations theorists, see Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983.)

Classical psychoanalytic technique was intended to be applied only to patients with a certain level of "ego strength," who could tolerate delving into their fantasies and forming a highly emotion-laden relationship with the analyst. The classical model suggested that one could understand the pathology of these neurotic patients by looking for points of psychosexual

fixation. A problem arose when psychoanalysts and psychodynamic psychotherapists began treating and charting the theoretical waters of pathology at a lower, more insidious "preoedipal" level. Cartographers with different tools and vantage points created an atlas of often conflicting maps of this region, which constitutes ego psychology and object relations theory.

Neurotic disorders presuppose, according to psychoanalytic theory, a conflict between desires and prohibitions, between impulses and the collection of identifications and ideals Freud called the superego. The problem with extending this line of thinking to "preoedipal" pathology (i.e., more severe than neurotic, and assumed to reflect psychic defects prior to the Oedipal years) is that many people with this kind of more severe pathology lack the solid core of identifications hypothesized to create the ego and superego and seem to face a much more malignant source of psychic pain than the neurotic: the question of whether they can survive, as a whole person with a complete identity, in a world of people who at times seem to them bent on their destruction, and whether they can experience their feelings—whether of hate, love, desperate need, or lust—without impulsively acting upon them, destroying, engulfing, or being engulfed.

Clinicians who worked with these people thus came to believe that what they were observing in their patients was a defect that began in the first years of life, before the establishment of morals embodied in the superego, when the child has to negotiate a place in the world as someone who is separate yet attached, and dependent yet able to trust that he will be cared for. Many theorists came to the belief that this defect ran much deeper than a neurotic solution to unrealistic wishes.

A model of psychosexual stages cannot alone account for pathology at this level, and the problem for psychoanalytic theory is the recognition that the hypothesized fixations of neurotics can occur at the same time as the developmental arrests of people with more severe pathology. If the era of the fixation does not, then, account for level of pathology, as psychoanalysis assumed, something else must account for the difference between someone who is neurotic and someone with a borderline disorder. A neurotic, according to the theory, can be orally fixated, which means a pathology arising in the first year of life. One sometimes encounters borderline patients with "anal" level pathology which is psychosexually more advanced, who are compulsive, tightly defended to the point of brittleness, and prone to sadistic behavior and outbursts. In what way, then, does the neurotic differ from the borderline, the narcissistic character, the schizoid personality, or the psychopath? I would contend that the difference lies in the level of narcissism and object relations, moral functioning, and ego development. The present chapter will begin by examining current approaches to the understanding of each of those domains, and will then offer a developmental model that encompasses them.

## Development of Personality

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF NARCISSISM AND OBJECT RELATIONS

In his *Analysis of the Self* Heinz Kohut relates the case of a patient described as suffering from a narcissistic disorder:

Patient C., for example, had the following dream during a period when he was looking forward to being publicly honored and celebrated: "The question was raised of finding a successor for me. I thought: How about God?" (1971, p. 149)

Jean-Paul Sartre writes in all earnestness, "The best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project it is to be God" (1957, p. 63). Patient C. has been diagnosed a narcissist; Sartre, a philosopher. One may question the validity of their diagnoses or suggest, as several psychoanalysts do, that the genus "narcissism" has both its normal and pathological species.

A number of theorists have defined narcissism a variety of ways; in the psychoanalytic literature since Hartmann (1950), the "libidinal cathexis of the self" has become the accepted definition. Freud defined narcissism as the libidinal cathexis of the ego. Hartmann amended this because one can make little sense of the cathexis of a structure responsible for cognition, perception, motility, defense, and the like. Freud had not systematically distinguished between ego, self, and self-concept, leaving his notions of narcissism and object love problematic.

The development of Freud's thought on narcissism has been traced a number of times (see Bing, McLaughlin, and Marburg, 1959; van der Waals, 1965; and Pulver, 1970) and will thus be treated only briefly here. Freud's earliest and most definitive statement on the subject is his rich and provocative paper, "On Narcissism" (1914), a dense and often confusing essay that has frequently been misunderstood. Freud developed his theory of narcissism prior to his later and final dual instinct theory (sex and aggression), and he never made a concerted effort to reconcile the two. The result has been a confusion in psychoanalytic theorizing about the relation between psychosexual theory and object relations theory.

Freud was not satisfied with his theory of narcissism (see Pulver, 1970), and with good reason: as Balint (1960) points out, Freud really presented three theories, not one. Balint refers to these as the theories of primary narcissism, primary object love, and primary autoeroticism. Perhaps the most coherent extrapolation of Freud's argument is the following. Originally the psyche is unstructured, and libido is stored in an undifferentiated ego-id. This is the state of autoeroticism, in which the neonate does not cathect—i.e., does not relate to—the world around him. With the differentiation of an ego and emergence of psychic structure, all the baby's libidinal cathects the ego (or, as Hartmann would say, the self). Freud calls this stage primary narcissism, and it is characterized by overvaluation of the

self (cf. Piagetian egocentrism). With increased maturity some of the libido may remain attached to the ego, while a significant portion of it will be sent out in two directions. The first path is object love: the libido formerly cathecting the ego becomes attached to an object. Especially in psychosis, according to Freud, libido which was attached to objects is withdrawn again into the ego, which accounts for megalomania. The second path involves the creation of the ego ideal: libido from the ego becomes invested in an ego ideal, which is a sane way of preserving infantile narcissism.

Clinically, this developmental model has great explanatory power, although its theoretical and empirical difficulties are significant, and one can preserve most of its virtues while eliminating the unnecessary libido terminology. A variety of psychoanalytic writers have criticized or elaborated upon this framework and its numerous permutations. Balint, for example, attacks the whole notion of primary narcissism, arguing that the infant's first state is one of intense relatedness to her environment which Balint calls "primary love" (1960). Balint is certainly right in pointing out that the theory that the infant does not originally "cathect" the world is empirically incorrect. Sucking and grasping behaviors, for example, are present from birth, and if the baby did not relate to the world around her (and simply hallucinated all her needs, as Freud contends), every infant would die of malnutrition well before the end of the first month.

The relation between narcissism and object love is a lively topic of debate in psychoanalytic literature. Pulver soundly defeats the hypothesis, derived from libido theory, of an inverse correlation between object love and self-love, noting, on the contrary, that those who love themselves are most capable of loving others (1970, p. 335). Van der Waals sees an element of narcissism in every object relationship. He describes a mutually satisfying sexual relationship in terms of "giving satisfaction to one another by actually pursuing egoistic wishes" (1965, p. 298), which sounds something like a sexualized *Wealth of Nations* in which each individual pursuing his own self-interest leads—as if by an "invisible genital"—to a mutual orgasm.

The increasing prevalence (or perhaps, some would say, recognition) of narcissistic disorders has generated a significant amount of psychoanalytic theorizing about narcissism, and two analysts in particular, Otto Kernberg (1975, 1976) and Heinz Kohut (1971, 1977), have developed competing and hotly debated models. Like other psychoanalytic approaches to narcissism, their theories of narcissism are simultaneously theories of object relations since one's attitude toward oneself in relation to others is an integral part of one's relation to others. As Kegan has put it, object relations are really subject-object relations (1982, p. 77). The models of Kernberg and Kohut are the principal views of object relations and narcissism in currency today and will thus be briefly explored here.

Kernberg's work (1975, 1976) is an attempt to integrate insights from

object relations theory (especially that of Klein, 1946, 1948; Fairbairn, 1952; and Jacobson, 1954, 1964) and ego psychology (especially Erikson, 1963) into psychoanalytic thinking without abandoning drive theory or the structural model (id, ego, superego). The basic logic of development, in broadest terms, is from a lack of awareness of self-other differentiation, to a differentiation of object- and self-representations based on enaction, to a differentiation of object- and self-representations based on affect (i.e., good versus bad), to an eventual construction of mature object representations (including self-representations) that integrate ambivalent feelings.

Central to Kernberg's developmental model is a movement from "splitting" to repression (and related defenses) as the ego's primary method of defense. Splitting, for Kernberg, means the separation of good and bad object representations. This mechanism originally stems from cognitive immaturity but later is used defensively against the perception of objects as both frustrating and gratifying. According to Kernberg, repression should attain primacy in the third year of life (1976, p. 69).

Kernberg delineates five stages in the development of object relations. The first he describes as a "Primary Undifferentiated" period (1976, p. 60), which corresponds to the first month of life. The psyche at this point, as in most psychoanalytic views of infancy, is basically unstructured, though forerunners to the ego start to emerge by the end of this phase.

The second stage is that of "Primary, Undifferentiated Self-Object Representations" (p. 60). During this period, which lasts roughly from the second to the sixth or eighth month, the infant develops a "good" self-object representation, which later develops into the core of the ego. This "good" representation does not distinguish self and other. "Good" at this stage means "me," and "bad" means "not-me" (p. 36). The good representation is invested with libido, and the bad representation, with aggression (p. 64).

The third stage, which ends between the eighteenth and thirty-sixth months, is that of the "Differentiation of Self- from Object-Representations" (p. 64). In this stage, self- and object-representations begin to separate within the "good" and "bad" camps, so that the child has images of good me, bad me, good mother, and bad mother. The child, however, still lacks integrated images of self and others since good and bad images remain separate. Splitting begins to be maintained actively in an effort to ward off anxiety (pp. 37, 67).

The fourth stage is that of the "Integration of Self-Representations and Object-Representations and the Development of Higher Intrapsychic Object Relations-Derived Structures," which begins in the latter part of the third year and lasts through the Oedipal period (p. 67). At this stage positive and negative self- and object-representations coalesce (p. 40), resulting in the formation of "total objects." In other words, the child devel-

ops integrated, ambivalent representations of self and others, and repression comes to replace splitting as a primary way of defending. Id, ego, and superego coalesce, as do images of self, object, ideal self, and ideal object.

The final stage is the "Consolidation of Superego and Ego Integration," in which ego identity solidifies and the superego matures (p. 72). The superego becomes depersonalized and abstract (p. 42), and the ego (which includes self- and object-representations) matures in its function of reality-testing.

Kohut's theory has stirred quite a controversy in psychoanalytic circles because he superimposes a "psychology of the self" upon classical psychoanalysis, arguing that a comprehensive psychology requires both a self psychology and a conflict psychology (1977, p. 78). His approach is predicated upon his notion of the "self," a term he uses in two different ways. In the *Analysis of the Self* he considers the self a collection of self-representations, analogous to an object-representation (1971, p. xv). In *The Restoration of the Self* his definition broadens considerably; here he refers to the self as a "psychological sector" comprised of ambitions, skills, and ideals (1977, p. 63). The former view of the self is consistent with previous psychoanalytic usage, whereas the latter poses the self as a structure on an equal footing with, if not superordinate to, id, ego, and superego.

In his later works (Kohut, 1977; Kohut and Wolf, 1978) Kohut views the self as a bipolar structure, consisting of ambitions on one side, ideals on the other, and "executive functions" poised between the two (1977, pp. 49, 54). The pole of ambitions emerges from the "grandiose self," an archaic structure that the infant erects to compensate for loss of primary narcissism. The pole of idealization arises from the "idealized parent imago," a similar vision of omnipotence, this time ascribed to the parent (1971).

Kohut's developmental theory begins, like Kernberg's (and almost every psychoanalytic writer), with an undifferentiated stage which Kohut calls "the stage of the fragmented self" (1971, p. 118). From this seething cauldron of drives, perceptions, affects, and whatever other condiments the infant desires in his ontogenetic primeval soup emerge the grandiose self and the idealized parent imago. Through these structures the baby attempts to preserve his original state of (imagined) perfection (1968, p. 86), ascribing omnipotence and omniscience to himself and to an idealized "selfobject" (1971, p. 3; cf. Winnicott's "transitional object," 1971) which he perceives as part of himself (Kohut, 1971, p. 25). What Kohut calls the nuclear self arises during the second year of life (Kohut and Wolf, 1978, p. 417) from the grandiose self, the idealized parent imago, and the rudimentary executive functions "arched" between them. This ushers in the "stage of the cohesive self" (1971, p. 32).

With the consolidation of the self, the child proceeds to the tasks of the

Oedipal years, as elucidated by classical psychoanalysis. During the Oedipal period the ego matures, and the idealized parent imago is introjected into the nascent superego (1971, p. 28) as well as the ego (where it performs functions largely related to drive-regulation, pp. 298-9). The ego also integrates facets of the grandiose self, providing goals, ambitions, and self-esteem (pp. 107, 299). Throughout life the narcissism of the grandiose self may be transformed into empathy, creativity, humor, and wisdom (1971, p. 299). Central to Kohut's theory is his contention that narcissism has both healthy and pathological transformations.

The theories of Kernberg and Kohut are complex, and the reader may have as much flavor for them after reading these very concise summaries as one has for Devon cream after eating a teaspoon of evaporated milk. Their theories converge and diverge on a number of issues (for an excellent discussion of their similarities and differences, see the panel discussion reported by Schwartz, 1973.) They differ, in particular, in their views on therapeutic technique and on specific beliefs about borderline and narcissistic pathology. At the theoretical level, perhaps the main difference lies in their energy concepts: Kernberg maintains a more Freudian stance, while Kohut moves somewhat away from the classical paradigm (which is a general difference between their approaches), practically positing a narcissistic drive (see Kohut's discussion of the "ego's capacity to tame narcissistic cathexes and to employ them for its highest aims," 1966, see also 1971, pp. 219-20) or at least viewing libido as a collection of several drives (1977, p. 23).

Their views have been debated in psychoanalytic circles as largely incompatible approaches, though one can detect a number of points of agreement between them. For example, parallel to Kohut's call for two complementary psychologies, one which examines the self and its defects, and the other which analyzes conflicts of a cohesive self, Kernberg distinguishes "two levels of internalized object relations," one of fragmented guises "two levels of internalized object relations," one of fragmented self- and object-representations, and the other of cohesive representations (1976, p. 245). Kernberg seems to agree with Kohut (1977, p. 227) that a firm self (and, he adds, cohesive object-representations) is an essential precondition for the experience of the Oedipus complex (1976, p. 200).

Further, Kohut's description of the "developmental stage" of the grandiose self, in which the child views himself as perfect and omnipotent and assigns "all imperfections to the outside" (1968, p. 96) sounds remarkably similar to Kernberg's stage in which "good" equals "me," and "bad" equals "not-me." Finally, Kohut's contrast of "vertical" and "horizontal" splits (1971, p. 193) is almost identical to Kernberg's contrast of splitting and repression. Both see splitting (Kohut's vertical splits) as characteristic of more severe pathology, and repression (Kohut's horizontal splits) as a later, less pathological phenomenon.

In general, object relations theorists of various theoretical stripes would agree on three broad suppositions. First, psychic development entails a gradual shift from a lack of realistic and cohesive self- and object-representations to the ability to form mature, multi-dimensional, ambivalently "cathected" representations. The person, in other words, gradually comes to experience herself and others as both good and bad, and is able to maintain positive feelings toward herself and others in the face of strong negative feelings and vice versa. Secondly, by the time this capacity has been achieved, significant ego development has occurred, as has the moral internalization which establishes the superego. Thirdly, with the establishment of the superego, the need-satisfying psychology of the preoedipal years begins to give way to a psychology in which one's own needs and impulses are tempered by internalized prohibitions and a recognition of the impact of one's actions on others.

#### MORAL DEVELOPMENT: CURRENT APPROACHES

Psychoanalytic thought on narcissism has had little relation to psychoanalytic theorizing about moral development. The latter is viewed in terms of the development of the superego, whereas theories of narcissism typically emphasize the preoedipal period. According to psychoanalytic theory, the superego arises as a precipitate of the Oedipus complex through the process of identification. As maturity approaches, the superego becomes less rigid and personalized, with internalized ideals and values substituting for internalized objects (introjects). In addition, the ego comes to assume many of the moral functions of the developmentally more primitive and punitive superego, though the mechanisms by which the ego comes to usurp moral authority are obscure.

The Freudian view of moral development suffers from four defects. The first is the connection between the development of the superego and the Oedipus-castration complex. (Elsewhere I have more thoroughly examined Freud's theory of internalization and the Oedipus complex and discussed the very problematic links to the superego and moral development; Westen, 1984b.) According to Freud the superego is the "heir to the Oedipus complex" (1933); by this he means that, in the male case, the child suffers an object loss when he gives up his mother as a sexual object, and he replaces the object with massive identifications with his father. He does this defensively, as a result of fear of castration. Thus, by introjecting his father, the boy develops a superego.

As even some writers within the Freudian tradition have recognized (see Flugel, 1945; Loevinger, 1976), the idea that the superego forms in "one fell swoop" (or a few fell swoops around age five) with the resolution of the Oedipus-castration complex is both implausible and contradicted by

empirical data. Psychoanalytic writers often speak of "archaic superego precursors" (Reich, 1954), early superego-like introjections of parental objects and/or demands. If such introjections occur before the Oedipal age, why should one suspect that a different mechanism is required to explain the formation of the rest of the superego? That preoedipal children have many isolated "pockets" of superego can be confirmed by any three-year-old's parents and suggests that superego formation need have little to do with Oedipal issues.

Freud's inability to conceptualize adequately the psychological development of females stems in large measure from this faulty view of the causes of superego development. In the male case, according to Freud, the child's fear of castration causes him to internalize the father and accept the father's morality. This poses a significant theoretical problem: since females cannot be castrated, why do they develop superegos? On several occasions Freud concluded that women must not have well-developed superegos, yet this is quite obviously incorrect. Empirical research, not to mention casual observation, suggests quite the opposite, that females in Western society (and in fact in almost all known societies) are socialized to focus on the needs of others and tend to hold more "humanistic" values (Hoffman, 1975). In point of fact, the majority of hysterics whom Freud analyzed were female, and he developed the notion that a conflict between internalized prohibitions and infantile sexual wishes is the root of neurosis in large part from his experience with hysterics. Freud's largely unsuccessful attempts (1925, 1931, 1933) at female psychology all fail precisely because he is trying to account for superego formation in terms of the Oedipus-castration complex. He should instead have recognized that if boys and girls both develop superegos, and only boys can fear impending castration, then the castration complex cannot explain superego development.

If Freud's hypothesized connection of superego and Oedipus-castration complex were true, one would expect that, in the male case, the father would vastly predominate over the mother in the boy's superego, i.e., that conscience should be largely derived from the father (see, for example, Freud, 1913, p. 157; 1923, p. 44). Again, reality runs counter to this prediction. Particularly in modern Western society, in which the father is often absent from the household for most of the day, moral training falls largely upon the shoulders of the mother. An empirical study by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) found that for both boys and girls, mother's child-rearing practices were more influential for child's moral development than father's. To try to answer this falsification of his theory, Freud might turn to the theory of the "negative Oedipus complex," which asserts that the child really wants both parents, so he identifies with each. In the male case, if the child is not to become homosexual, he must still internalize his

father *more*; yet again, many if not most moral internalizations in most cultures are maternal or at least feminine.

A central problem here is the failure to distinguish between gender identification and moral internalization. The child's gender identification may in part stem from Oedipal issues; however, his moral internalization, except where it overlaps with his ideal image of his own sex, is not largely dependent upon the Oedipus complex. Indeed, one wonders, in the Freudian model, why the superego includes nonsexual injunctions: why does the child internalize the value of sharing, for example, which relates neither to sex nor aggression? The psychoanalytic model fails to separate ideal self-images formed through identification, some of which are gender-specific, from moral beliefs, which are largely independent of gender and Oedipal issues.

This is not to suggest that the Oedipus complex is not of tremendous psychological significance, at least in cultures with nuclear families, or that children do not develop prohibitions against incest.<sup>1</sup> The reader need only try for a moment to imagine himself or herself engaged in sexual intercourse with a parent to recognize the strength of these prohibitions. Rather, the point is that all moral development is not contingent, by and large, upon psychosexual development or the vicissitudes of the Oedipus complex.

A clinical example clearly differentiates Oedipal dynamics from moral development. The patient, a stocky middle aged man, was an only child from a midwestern Italian family. He had considerable conflicts around sexuality which inhibited enjoyment of a normal sex life, and had developed the fantasy as a child that his father's sexual activity with his mother had left her unable to bear more than one child. He also had difficulty establishing an identity as a competent male and had considerable conflicts around homosexual impulses. He had tried as a child to minimize identification with his father, who had a long history of trouble with the law, and had become something of a "confessor" to his mother, resulting in exacerbation of Oedipal issues.

The patient very early developed a hyper-moral stance and had been, through his twenties, a priest. From an Oedipal perspective, his choice of the priesthood was a compromise-formation: by being his mother's confessor he could be her closest confidante, while at the same time renouncing his Oedipal wish by renouncing masculine sexuality. This explanation, while true, ignores two other aspects of the compromise that cannot be

<sup>1</sup> It is not entirely clear, however, that these prohibitions stem either from childhood fantasies or from socialization. Evidence from Israeli kibbutzim (Shepher, 1971) suggests that the incest taboo may well have biological roots. It would certainly be an odd twist of fate if the castration complex were in part a rationalization of a biological aversion, a misattribution of a biologically based feeling of disgust.

explained psychosexually: first, in his culture the priesthood represents the pinnacle of power and worth, so that becoming a priest was a way to gain self-esteem and the esteem of others; and secondly, priests were the most available male figures of identification other than his father, so that in trying to reject identification with his father he could nonetheless develop an ideal of nondefective (though neuter) manhood.

What the psychoanalytic theory of superego formation least accounts for in this case is the patient's devout Catholicism and high moral standards. The Oedipal theory leads one to expect a linear correlation between identification with the father and strength of the superego. In this example, in contrast, moral development through internalization of religious values and identification with the Church occurred *at the expense of* identification with the father, who was seen as sinful and earthly. Because the patient could not, so to speak, find a father at home, he found a holy father in the Church. The questions the psychoanalytic theory cannot answer are why he, like most children, *wanted* to find someone with whom to identify, how moral development could occur in a man (who as an adult is very ethical and sensitive to the effects of his actions on others) despite problematic identification with his father, and how religion can offer a sense of meaning that has very little to do with infantile sexual issues.

A second problem with the psychoanalytic theory of moral development is that Freud left ambiguous the relationship between superego, ego, and the institution he called the ego ideal. While a literature has arisen on the concept of the ego ideal (which Freud developed in 1914 but on the never reconciled with his later structural model) and its relation to the superego (see, for example, Reich, 1954; Novey, 1955; Hartmann and Loewenstein, 1962), psychoanalysts have arrived at no consensus on this issue. Whether the ego takes on moral functions of the superego as maturity approaches is unclear (which is a necessary hypothesis since Freud views the superego as fairly primitive and not subject to historical change, whereas values do, in fact, change throughout the lifespan as well as historically), and whether the ego or superego ultimately determines action or is responsible for self-punishment is ambiguous. Issues about the functional relations between the three structures abound. Whether the rider or the saddle—let alone the horse—ultimately prevails is unclear in the Freudian paradigm.

A third difficulty, intimated above, is that Freud provides no mechanism for generational change in the superego. The child's superego "is in fact constructed on the model not of its parents but of its parents' superego" (1933, p. 67). In other words, cultural and historical conditions leave little or no imprint on the superego: once it is established, it is preserved forever. If the superego really is the psychic center of morality



(which is its function), then this is unrenable. Moral values do, in fact, change over time, and one has little reason to believe that twentieth century "superegos" are exact or nearly exact replicas of the earliest *Homo sapiens*.

Finally, the Freudian notion of morality as represented by the superego is unable to account for true moral autonomy. Superego morality entails the following of parental or social rules. Existential philosopher Ortega comments, "Whether he be original or a plagiarist, man is the novelist of himself" (1961, p. 156). History and anthropology suggest that most people prefer to retype an aging manuscript—perhaps with an occasional change in punctuation—rather than to create an original piece of literature. In the moral realm, Freudian theory can accommodate only the plagiarist: the superego is passed from generation to generation like a family heirloom, and the mature individual is one whose depersonalized superego (i.e., a superego with generalized rules as opposed to internalized parental objects and their particular commands) acts in harmony with his selectively identifying ego (i.e., an ego which identifies with various objects selectively instead of wholesale). The problem with this model is that it confuses internalization with autonomy. That an individual no longer requires the vigilance of his parents in matters of morality may well be a sign of a more entrenched heteronomy, rather than a true autonomy. Such an individual does not act upon his own standards; he simply no longer requires active participation by his parents or society to ensure that he will perform in the manner *they* perceive as morally correct.

Put one more way, the psychoanalytic model of moral development fails in that it cannot explain an individual like Nietzsche. Nietzsche came to overturn the very core of his superego, questioning the notions of good and evil themselves, concluding that the dominant equation of "good" with "altruistic" is a perversion of true conscience (1887). Did Nietzsche possess a strong ego with an extraordinary capacity for "selective identification," or was he simply a psychopath or pathological narcissist? The Freudian framework can offer few other possibilities, and its inability to provide insight into such an individual is especially significant, given Freud's assessment of Nietzsche as possessing "a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any man who ever lived or was ever likely to live" (Kaufman, citing Jones, 1975, p. 20).

Outside of psychoanalysis, the leading models of the psychology of moral development are the cognitive-developmental models of Piaget and his disciple, Lawrence Kohlberg, and the social learning approach. For Piaget (1932), morality involves a respect for rules, and moral development proceeds in two stages. In the first stage the child's respect for rules is derivative of her respect for the authorities who teach the rules. In this

stage, which Piaget calls "conformity" or "constraint," the child views rules as immutable and eternal. Authority is absolute, and actions, not intentions, determine culpability. In the second stage of "cooperation" or "autonomy," the child perceives rules as the product of social interaction and group choice, not as divine mandates. With the second stage, which emerges roughly between ages eight and twelve, a mutual respect replaces the unilateral respect for adult authorities.

Kohlberg argues that moral development can be viewed in terms of six stages, organized into three levels of moral reasoning, each comprised of two stages (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1968; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972). The first level of moral development Kohlberg calls "preconventional," in which the child accepts labels of good and bad but interprets them in terms of the power of those who create rules or the hedonistic implications of action (i.e., whether one will be punished or rewarded). In the first stage, the child is oriented toward punishment and obedience, and in the second, which Kohlberg calls "instrumental relativism," reciprocity emerges but "is a matter of 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours' not of loyalty, gratitude or justice" (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969, p. 100).

At the second, or "conventional" level, the person comes to value the moral code of her family or society in itself, regardless of hedonistic implications. In both the third and fourth stages, the child maintains rules and commands to which she tries to conform. The third stage involves a "good boy"/"good girl" orientation, and the fourth is characterized by a "law and order" emphasis.

The third level, "post-conventional" morality, entails the belief in universal moral principles not tied to a particular authority or social group. In the fifth stage, a social contract prevails, and actions viewed as just are those with the greatest social utility; principles of democracy, legality, and contract predominate. In the final stage, morality involves universal principles: the individual chooses principles such as the greatest good for the greatest number, and she refuses to treat herself as an exception to those rules even when expediency contradicts them. In this stage the person believes in equality and the value of individual liberty.<sup>1</sup>

The cognitive approaches of Piaget and Kohlberg have proven valuable in two ways. First, they have attempted to operationalize, and, in the case

<sup>1</sup> Though he is never explicit about it, Kohlberg appears to believe that ontogeny recapitulates history in the development of morals. The idea of a social contract has its roots in Sophist philosophy but was not prevalent in the West until the eighteenth century. Similarly, Kohlberg appears to see twentieth century America as a prototype of moral development at the societal level, with its principles of democracy and formal equality, although he could and may equally argue that a future socialist society might better approximate the Stage 6 ideal. In a footnote to an article (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969), he endorses the notion of societal evolution of morals (p. 106n).



of Kohlberg, measure the development of moral judgment, as opposed to theorizing about it using only case examples as data. Secondly, they have emphasized that children do not simply internalize parental prohibitions but actively construct their understanding of these principles. This is, of course, an extension of Piaget's constructivist epistemology to the moral realm. Piaget and Kohlberg both point out that a child's knowledge of moral rules, like all other knowledge, is constrained by the limitations of the child's cognitive apparatus. Though Freudians did not previously emphasize the cognitive side of superego development, they recognized from the start that the superego is the child's construction or representation of parental norms, not a direct reflection of parental rules. Kohlberg's perspective in particular has the added advantage of suggesting a stage of moral development beyond the collection of injunctions and prohibitions which comprises the superego.

Despite these merits, Kohlberg's theory, in particular, has been vigorously criticized (Kurtines and Greif, 1974; Hoffman, 1977), though often on methodological grounds, which will not be repeated here. Rather, I will focus on six more general problems with his approach to moral development. (For an excellent review of critical commentary on Kohlberg, see Lickona, 1976.) First, Kohlberg and Piaget are both guilty of smuggling a number of value judgments under their lab coats. This becomes particularly clear when one examines the philosophical underpinnings of their psychological theories. One could argue that the relation between Piaget and Kohlberg is similar to that of Rousseau and Kant: Piaget recapitulates Rousseau's error which influenced Kant, and Kohlberg recapitulates Kant's error by following Piaget. Rousseau asserts that deep within the human heart lies a divinely implanted morality. The primitive individual in a presocial state of nature could apprehend this moral law directly. Rousseau conceives of the "natural man" as a being motivated by self-interest and a natural compassion or "pity" that gives him pain to perceive the misfortune of another sentient being. Society has now corrupted and climinated this natural man, but through reason one can rediscover the moral truth within one's breast. The truly free person is one who perceives and follows the dictates of his divinely-inspired conscience. Since all people reason alike, and the moral law is the same for all, if everyone were to withdraw to his corner of the world and discover and follow his conscience in the silence of the passions, the result would be a harmonious "general will." The general will, for Rousseau, is the collective will of the community, and its aim is the good of the group. In essence, conscience is identical to the general will, and to act autonomously is to follow this divine law.

The problem for Rousseau is that people do not always reason correctly, are often swayed by selfishness, and thus misperceive the Good. On

the societal level, the "will of all" does not always reflect the general will.<sup>1</sup> In the case of a disagreement between individual conscience and the will of all as to the morally correct action, the will of all must prevail because it is the closest approximation to the general will. If the individual disagrees with the collective belief, he must, to use Rousseau's curious phrase, be "forced to be free," since freedom consists in obedience to reason, which is embodied in the general will. The individual thus must be compelled to act "autonomously," i.e., freely. The same difficulty is endemic to Piaget's moral psychology: autonomy is defined in terms of conformity to group decisions.

Kant, like Rousseau, believes that reason can prescribe ends, and that freedom consists in subordinating individual desire to a "categorical imperative" to treat other people as ends in themselves as opposed to means to one's own ends. Reason, according to Kant, does not bow to particular interests; a rational morality is one that can be universalized (i.e., a person cannot make himself an exception to his own moral rules). For Kant, then, moral autonomy entails imposing upon oneself or "self-choosing" a set of preordained, ready-made principles (which are essentially rationalizations of Judeo-Christian morality). If a rational individual imposes upon himself a *different* set of principles, he must, according to Kant, be reasoning incorrectly, and not acting "autonomously." Similarly, for Kohlberg, post-conventional, self-chosen principles are by definition either social contrararian or universalizable Kantian moral commands. The problem is that one could conceivably develop and freely accept other types of moral values that, for example, cannot be universalized. Kohlberg, like Kant, would contend that a person of this sort is not acting "autonomously" (i.e., in line with Kohlberg and Kant's moral views), and he would add that the person's thinking is regressive (as in the often observed phenomenon among college students of Stage 2 morality following Stage 4).

This whole line of thinking rests upon the mistaken view, pervasive in moral philosophy, that reason can provide ends, and that the ends it chooses are altruistic ones. The fundamental difficulty with the moral philosophy of both Kant and Rousseau and the moral psychology of Piaget and Kohlberg is the assumption that all people who reason "correctly" will come to the same moral truth. This leads to a misbegotten view of autonomy that tries, unsuccessfully, to unite free thought with a preor-

<sup>1</sup> Plato recognized this problem and concluded that the philosopher who can understand the Good must also be a king who can implement and enforce it. Hobbes came to terms with the same issue, investing the sovereign with the power to decide moral questions. Similarly, Rousseau invents a divinely inspired "legislator" (and a tutor, on the individual level), modeled after Plato's philosopher-king, to direct society so that the will of all coincides with the general will. For Rousseau, as for Plato, the difficulty lies in determining who, in fact, is qualified to be the lawgiver. Hobbes provided the only consistent answer to this question yet devised: might makes right.

dained end. One cannot have both autonomy and moral absolutism: either one allows people to think autonomously, in which case one cannot be sure of the conclusions they will reach, or one demands that everyone accept the same moral view, in which case one must stifle all free thought. Rousseau, Kant, Piaget, and Kohlberg fail in their moral theorizing because they try to maintain the contradictory values of individual autonomy and moral absolutism. This is, indeed, one of the central conflicts of liberal moral and political philosophy.

The second problem with Kohlberg's theory is the confounding of two distinct phenomena: post-conventional morality as ability to form abstract conceptualizations and as self-chosen morality. One can see this confusion quite clearly by examining the evolution of his ideas. In 1963 he saw the highest level of moral development as involving the ability to generalize the norms of one's society (Kohlberg, 1963). This is a very Piagetian view, which essentially views moral maturity as the application of formal operational thinking to moral reasoning. By 1969, the definition of post-conventional morality had shifted to denote the "effort to define moral values which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups" (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969, p. 101). In this latter view, the essence of post-conventional morality is that it is self-chosen, logical, and not derivable from one's specific culture. Note the difference between this approach and the earlier claim that moral maturity entails the ability to abstract a "formal system" from "a set of agreed-upon assumptions" (1963, pp. 29-30). These agreed-upon assumptions are rooted in the culture, not spontaneously generated or culture-free.

An example will make this criticism more clear. Thomas Aquinas was a very bright fellow, surely capable of formal operational thinking. Had he attempted a systemized Christian ethics, the project would likely have entailed an attempt to bring together the various moral laws of Christianity into a consistent set of values, perhaps derived from a few assumptions (e.g., about the nature of God). This would have been post-conventional in the cognitive sense, in that it would have applied abstract thinking to moral phenomena. Yet Aquinas's ethics would surely have been conventional in the sense that he would not have questioned the pillars of Christian faith as to what constitute morally correct and incorrect courses of action. Similarly, if a member of the Gestapo had taken Hitler's premises about purifying the human race and developed a consistent moral system from these principles, can one say that he displayed the same level of moral judgment as the member of the underground who rejected entirely the current "agreed-upon assumptions"?

This leads to the third problem, the confounding of cognitive *processes* with *content*, resulting in a view of moral development with a significant

value bias. Kohlberg finds hedonism morally repulsive and consequently relegates it to Stage 2 morality, even though it frequently appears in late adolescence or early adulthood (see, e.g., Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969). As noted above, Kohlberg sides with the type of morality developed by Kant, with its rationalistic and individualistic bent. Stage 6 morality proclaims the rights of human beings as "*individual persons*" (p. 101), and Stage 5 involves a legalistic, social-contract orientation predicated on notions of individual rights. To say that one aspect of moral development involves the ability to develop coherent principles instead of ad hoc rules is entirely different than to argue for the psychological superiority of a particular moral view. One can think abstractly as a libertarian or reactionary just as one can as a liberal individualist.

Fourthly, this importation of content into the domain of process renders Kohlberg's theory culture-bound. That preindustrial, non-Western people tend not to reach Stages 5 and 6 is not surprising given that they are not indoctrinated from birth with social contract notions and proclamations of individual liberty, as are Americans. Kohlberg, like Piaget, tends to underestimate the extent to which both cognitive and moral schemas are culturally constituted.

A fifth problem is that the theory is sex-biased in favor of males (see Gilligan, 1982). Not only did Kohlberg generalize stages he discovered in studying a sample of males, but the type of morality he views as the pinnacle of moral development is one historically practiced primarily by male philosophers. More concretely, he explains the fact that women, in contrast to men, are more likely to remain at Stage 3 than at Stage 4 by noting that "personal concordance morality is a functional morality for housewives and mothers; it is not for businessmen and professionals" (1969, p. 108). I have difficulty seeing how a woman who cares for her family is less morally mature than a businessman who replaces workers with machines. Coles (1981) and others have criticized this model of moral autonomy for emphasizing the cognitive side of moral reasoning, which establishes men like Kant as moral giants, without regard to their actions. This suggests a final objection, which many have raised, and which applies to both Kohlberg and Piaget, that cognitive-developmental approaches to moral development do not account for moral behavior. A person may have lofty ideals while nevertheless treating people like dirt; the ideals may serve as a magical amulet that protects the person from recognizing his actual baseness.

Aside from psychoanalytic and cognitive-developmental theories, the other major approach to moral development is social learning theory. (For a more complete account of competing views of moral development, see Lickona, 1976; Hoffman, 1980.) Social learning theorists argue that morality, defined as prosocial or altruistic behaviors (Mischel and Mis-

chel, 1976), is learned like any other kind of behavior, through cognitively mediated conditioning and socially mediated learning, particularly modeling. The production of moral or prosocial behavior depends both upon the (cognitive) competence and the inducement to do so (Mischel and Mischel, 1976; Bandura, 1977a). The competence involved in prosocial acts is primarily developed through watching other people perform them, and the incentive to perform them oneself comes from an assessment of response contingencies (i.e., one learns from both trial and error and vicarious conditioning that one will be punished or rewarded for certain acts). In addition, people learn to regulate their own behavior through self-reinforcement, by punishing failures to achieve standards and rewarding ability to delay gratification.

Social learning theorists, notably Mischel (Mischel and Mischel, 1976), have taken issue with both psychoanalytic and cognitive accounts of moral development. Against psychoanalysis, Mischel argues that the superego is not a unified structure, and that studies have demonstrated only modest correlations (around .3) between indexes of moral judgment, prosocial behavior, and guilt. Against Kohlberg, Mischel emphasizes the importance of social learning in the development of specific moral beliefs.

The social learning approach has considerable merit in explaining the roots of some prosocial actions in terms of cognitively and socially mediated learning. One can readily see how a child who is punished for fighting may come to see fighting as a maladaptive response. Further, Mischel's criticisms of psychoanalytic and cognitive-developmental theories are in some respects well taken. Psychodynamic psychologists too frequently speak of "the superego" as if it were a single, coherent agency, ignoring the impact of specific situations in evoking particular standards. Kohlberg is indeed guilty of failing to examine the extent to which his higher levels of moral development simply represent the modeling of culturally constructed moral systems.

Mischel's critique, however, also rests in part upon misunderstanding. That studies have demonstrated cross-situational inconsistencies in prosocial behavior is not problematic for psychoanalysis, which sees most behaviors as compromises between wishes and internal standards. One would expect, therefore, that situations that permit greater rewards for impulsive behavior will show a lower incidence of behavior in accord with superego standards. Psychoanalysis is predicated on the notion of psychic conflict, and nothing in the theory implies that people will always obey internalized standards.

Mischel equally misunderstands Kohlberg by equating moral development with the strengthening of "prosocial behaviors" and then showing that such behaviors are not linearly related to Kohlberg's stages. Kohlberg's moral situations are precisely those in which the person must choose

between *two* "prosocial behaviors," such as obeying the law versus saving one's wife's life. Kohlberg is thus interested in moral dilemmas and their resolution, not in the rate of altruistic responding. One might, in fact, expect the highest production of prosocial behaviors in many cultures and situations among people with conventional moral reasoning, who are interested in others' opinions of them and in the welfare of members of their particular group.

In situations of conflict the problems with the shallow focus on moral behaviors inherited from behaviorism become most apparent because at such points the whole question is which behavior is moral. Is a helpful Nazi, who "pitches in" and volunteers his time to the cause of the Final Solution behaving prosocially? Is the person who refuses to drop napalm on Southeast Asian peasants despite draft laws behaving antisocially? These kinds of questions are the stuff of moral angst, and they are entirely outside the scope of social learning theory.<sup>1</sup>

The social learning approach to moral development is problematic in other respects as well. While one can easily see how a child comes to the conclusion that untamed aggression will ultimately have unpleasant consequences for him, what this approach fails to explain is why such judgments are deemed *moral*, as opposed to *practical*. Why, for example, does the child come to see stealing as morally wrong, even when he can get away with it? Bandura would certainly be correct in arguing that the child may actually cheat despite the moral belief, but this does not explain why the child would feel guilty in doing so. If people respond to moral dilemmas in the situation-specific way social learning theory suggests, they should be able to discriminate situations in which they would do well to behave altruistically and experience guilt (understood by Mischel and Bandura as anticipation of bad consequences) as those in which they are likely

<sup>1</sup> They are also entirely ignored in psychological constructs such as "social skills," "social adjustment," and "social competence." Mischel, for example, contends that intelligence is highly correlated with honesty and social and interpersonal adjustment (Mischel and Mischel, 1976, pp. 86-7). It is difficult to see how anyone who has been affiliated with a university as long as he has could hold such a belief; academia is riddled with brilliant people who withdrew into their intellects because they could not deal with people, were scapegoats as children, are social isolates, are tremendously competitive, are misanthropes, or some delightful combination of these. In sum, one can be intellectually competent, as or many people with borderline disorders are, yet be unable to maintain warm, lasting, and satisfying relationships with people. Further, to posit an abstract notion of "social skills" or "social competence" without considering the ends to which these alleged skills or competencies are used makes little sense. Hitler was tremendously adept at convincing people to follow him, and many "socially competent" people joined him. Millions of well-adjusted, milk-drinking American men are, at any given moment, ready to go to a foreign country (preferably an underdeveloped one) and kill "enemies" about whom they have not bothered to learn anything. Is this social competence? Erich Fromm perceptively raised these issues from a psychological perspective decades ago (Fromm, 1955), questioning the relation between social adjustment and sanity in an "insane" society.

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to be caught. This is not, of course, how real people act or feel, though certainly the threat of punishment increases prosocial behavior. This is because it activates a second cognitive-evaluative mismatch, aside from that relating to moral standards or ideals, which involves fear for one's well-being.

The question the social learning account cannot address is why the child comes to view internalized moral standards as his own, as opposed to impositions to be avoided when possible. The function of modeling is to facilitate learning in the absence of direct reinforcement. In the case of moral learning, however, modeling often runs directly counter to one's conditioning, as when a child models the virtues of sharing and finds himself with one tenth of a piece of cake. According to Bandura, modeling occurs most in situations in which the consequences of various actions are ambiguous (1977a, p. 90). This is rarely the case in moral learning, since moral values are frequently self-abnegatory. The question, then, is why the child accepts as not only a prudent maxim, but as a moral truth various standards modeled from adults, many of which run counter to experience. If moral beliefs are expectations about response contingencies, then the same human beings Mischel characterizes as infinitely flexible in discriminating situationally appropriate responses are remarkably poor assessors of probable outcomes.

Another problem with the social learning approach to moral development relates to the notion of self-reinforcement. One can readily see how a person could learn to reinforce herself so as to maximize long-term self-interest. What cannot be explained from a social learning perspective is how a person could learn to resist temptation for the benefit of someone else. Delay of gratification and impulse control are not inherently moral. They may be used to further altruistic or egoistic ends (through maximization of long-term self-interest). As argued in Chapter 3, despite centuries of philosophical denial, nothing guarantees that altruistic morality and long-term self-interest coincide.

### EGO DEVELOPMENT: CURRENT APPROACHES

A third approach relevant to an examination of personality development is one with its roots in psychoanalytic ego psychology, namely the study of ego development. Rapaport (1959) distinguished several historical periods in the development of Freud's thinking regarding the ego, from his earliest view of the ego as consciousness or "self" to his final statement in the *Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1939), in which he conceives of the ego as a structure responsible for perception, action, judgment, reality-testing, defense, and related functions. Freud's lifelong emphasis on the id and instinctual life led him to focus on the ego's defensive function. Heinz Hart-

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mann inaugurated a new way of thinking about the ego in 1937 with his lectures on the ego, later published as *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* (1939), in which he explored the function of the ego as an organ of adaptation to reality. (For a history of the evolution of the concepts of ego and ego development, see Blanck and Blanck, 1974; Loewinger, 1976a.)

Perhaps the clearest and most definitive statement of the psychoanalytic perspective on ego development is Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein's classic paper, "Comments on the Formation of Psychic Structure" (1946). Hartmann and his colleagues argue, in contrast to Freud's most frequent position that the ego develops out of the id, that ego and id develop out of an undifferentiated matrix. The importance of this theoretical shift is that it establishes the presence from birth of strictly cognitive, reality-oriented ego functions. Freud, in contrast, viewed the ego (including its cognitive functions) as a precipitate of the frustration of drives. According to Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, the psyche is originally undifferentiated in another sense: the infant lacks coherent representations of self and objects, so that self and other are not yet distinguished. This is an aspect of psychoanalytic ego psychology with which infancy researchers of most theoretical perspectives would agree (see Ainsworth, 1969).

According to Hartmann and his colleagues, psychic differentiation and development occurs for both cognitive-maturational and dynamic reasons. For example, before a child can tolerate absence of his primary caretaker, he must learn to modulate his need for immediate indulgence. Once he has matured cognitively to the point at which he can form a psychic representation of his mother and her love, he becomes even more vulnerable to anxiety because he can now fear loss of her or of her affection.

Like most currently practicing psychodynamic clinicians, Hartmann and his colleagues believe that the development of the ego "proceeds along with that of the child's object relations" (p. 23). With ego development comes an ability to form a constant representation of a love object despite the child's need-state. The development of object relations proceeds from an undifferentiated primary narcissism, to the use of others to satisfy drives and impulses, to the ability to love others in themselves and the internalization of the superego.

Erikson (1963, 1968) has proposed a theory of ego development (actually, psychosocial development) that tries to bridge Freud's more biological or organismic approach with an understanding of the role of culture and historical forces. He argues that people go through a series of "crises," by which he means turning points in psychological development in which the evolving psyche faces both danger and opportunity for growth. The first stage is "basic trust vs. mistrust," in which the task for the infant is to develop a sense of himself and his social world as safe and consistent

through time. In "autonomy vs. shame and doubt," the child needs to accept himself as a separate source of will and action. Problematic passage through this stage results in chronic shame, inability to tolerate separateness, or a faulty sense of self and will. The third stage, "initiative versus guilt," establishes the superego through identification. In "industry versus inferiority," the child comes to learn the ways of her culture and to develop competence in culturally prescribed areas, but the danger is a pervasive sense of incompetence and inferiority.

Adolescence (or therabouts) is the age of "identity versus identity confusion," in which the person must develop or accept an identity which is objectively recognized (by his social group) and subjectively experienced as authentic and worthwhile. One of the many virtues of Erikson's theory is that it provides insight into psychic functioning and development after puberty. The task of the next stage, "intimacy vs. isolation," is to learn to love and become intimate with a person who is experienced as separate and worthy of commitment. In "generativity versus stagnation" the task is to feel productive and concerned for the next generation. The final stage is "integrity versus despair," in which the person either accepts that he has lived his one life and lived it well or feels a profound sense of despair and wasted opportunity. Of course, Erikson does not view these stages as "all-or-nothing;" rather, in each stage the person experiences a ratio of the opportunity to the danger (e.g., trust to mistrust), which influences passage through the next stage.

Outside of clinical practice, the main approach to ego development is that of Jane Loevinger and her colleagues (1966, 1976a). For two decades Loevinger has been developing a method, based on analysis of answers to a sentence-completion task, for empirically examining ego development. Her work is a pleasure to read because it is informed by a critical and theoretically sophisticated mind as well as by a body of verifiable data. (For reviews of her theory and research, see Hauser, 1976; Noam, Kohlberg, and Snarey, 1983).

Loevinger poses ego development as a "master trait," second only to intelligence in accounting for human variability on a variety of tasks (1966, p. 205). Ego development, for Loevinger, includes impulse control, character development, interpersonal relations, and conscious preoccupations (as well as, she claims at one point, "cognitive mode," 1976). Her theory is related to Kohlberg's theory of moral development both conceptually and empirically: like Kohlberg, she posits development from pre-conformist to conformist to postconformist stages, and her measure of ego development correlates highly with Kohlberg's measure of moral development (see Noam, Kohlberg, and Snarey, 1983).

Loevinger (1976a) views the ego as a process, not a thing, and she conceives of her stages as representing both a developmental sequence and

a character typology. The first stage she calls "presocial," during which the main task is to separate self from nonself. During the second, or "impulsive" stage, the child is preoccupied with his own wishes and impulses, and others are "seen and valued in terms of what they can give him" (1976, p. 16). The third stage is the "self-protective" stage, in which the child or the adult whose development has been arrested at this level has developed some capacity to control his or her impulses through anticipation of short-term rewards and punishments. The person remains essentially hedonistic, though Loevinger adds a sense of guardedness and vulnerability and a tendency to externalize blame.

In the "conformist" stage, the child identifies with powerful parental figures, and moral values are partially internalized. The conformist is cooperative, seeks approval, and identifies with a group; she or he is not attuned to internal psychological states or motivations. The next stage Loevinger calls "consciousness," in which internalization of rules has proceeded "to include self-administration of sanctions, self-evaluations, and self-selection of the rules to be followed" (1976b, p. 290). Introspection increases, and the person becomes aware of discrepancies between perceived self and moral standards. This stage received its name for two reasons. First, the person at this stage has developed an adult conscience. Secondly, though Loevinger is not entirely explicit about it, her prototype for this stage is the conscientious objector (see 1976a, p. 21). According to Loevinger, the model or typical personality in Western societies is somewhere between the conformist and conscientious stages, at a transitional level she calls "self-aware" (p. 19).

The next stage is the "autonomous" stage, although it is preceded by another transitional period, the "individualistic level." At this level the person cherishes individuality and comes to appreciate internal conflicts, though the recognition and partial transcendence of conflicts is not more developed until the autonomous stage. In that stage the person recognizes and values the autonomy of both self and others. Unlike the individualistic person, the autonomous individual recognizes the limits of personal autonomy. The final stage, about which Loevinger says relatively little, is called "integrated," which she compares to Maslow's self-actualized person. Unlike the autonomous person, according to Loevinger, the integrated person has consolidated a sense of identity (p. 26).

While Loevinger's model offers, in broadest strokes, a useful way of conceptualizing ego development, in its particulars it is problematic in a number of respects. First, like Kohlberg's theory, while the model purports to be structural, in actuality it confuses content and structure. By and large a person who is liberal-to-leftist in an individualistic society will score higher than someone who is not, and given that liberal political values or individualistic attitudes are as much a product of socialization as ego

development, this poses a serious problem. For example, a person who completes a sentence completion item, "Education . . ." with "should be available to all" will be scored as conscientious, whereas one who answers, "is good for getting a job" will be classified as self-protective (Loevinger, Westler, and Redmore, 1970). While this may indeed represent an ego-psychological difference, it may also simply reflect differential class, cultural, or historical circumstances. In hard economic times people are more likely to focus upon education's utilitarian value, and surely not everyone in a preiterate society or a working class neighborhood is developmentally stunted at a stage before conscience.

This confusion of content and structure leads to a second problem, the inference of ego-psychological differences from cultural differences. People at the conformist stage value niceness, helpfulness, and cooperation, whereas those at the self-protective stage are competitive and self-interested (1976, p. 18). New Yorkers are therefore by and large less developed than Georgians or rural Mexicans. In reality, people can internalize individualism just as they can internalize communalism. In both cases the psychological processes are similar, though the content is different.

Thirdly, because the measure focuses so heavily on conscious verbal responses, it does not discriminate intelligent, liberal people with severe ego defects from those who actually are quite integrated and ego-psychologically mature. Many, if not most, people with borderline personality disorders are very intelligent and many hold left-wing political beliefs; yet from an ego-psychological perspective, they are unable to modulate their emotions, have tremendous difficulty in regulating self-esteem, frequently blur self and other, and are often unable to maintain a coherent sense of self or identity. Such people are frequently attracted to extremist ideology because it splits the world into unambiguous categories of good and bad, maintains a sense of coherent goals and values, and permits expression of rage. It also fits in with their understanding of the world as cruel and malevolent while simultaneously fulfilling longings for a merger with others and for the end of real societal struggles that become projective screens for tremendous psychic battles. This is not, of course, to imply that all or most radicals are motivated by ego defects, or that armed or unarmed struggle is not frequently a reasonable response to state terrorism of the right or the left. Nevertheless, many severely disturbed people hold seemingly humanistic, egalitarian, or otherwise "enlightened" values that compensate for murderous rage or reflect the desperate need for unambiguous ideology upon which to rest identity, and these people would often score high on Loevinger's scale.

In general, Loevinger's model suffers from a lack of clinical grounding. I am not simply saying this as a snotty clinician who would like to claim that no one without clinical experience can understand personality. Unfor-

unately, I do not have enough clinical experience myself to make such a self-serving, condescending claim personally useful. Rather, I am simply arguing that Loevinger's model relies upon a number of stereotypes that clinical observation simply will not permit. For example, to view consolidation of a sense of identity as an accomplishment of the final "integrated" stage reached by only a few belies the experience of many of us who may not have reached such a stage but nonetheless clearly experience and are recognized by others to have a stable identity. Similarly, to argue that people at low levels of ego development do not experience profound depression (p. 20) is clearly wrong. Loevinger's prototype of psychic maturity appears to be the well analyzed adult, yet many such people, who are well aware of many of their more primitive conflicts, are much less able to rein in sadistic impulses and commit themselves to other people than some people without much introspective awareness who are nevertheless steady as an ox.

Finally, Loevinger's model and measure is too highly correlated with intellectual competence to be useful as a measure of ego development. Loevinger's model is highly correlated with IQ and verbal fluency (see Hauser, 1976). This is not simply a problem of discriminant validity (i.e., discriminating one construct from another; Campbell and Fiske, 1959). The problem, as suggested earlier, is that many brilliant people are ego-psychologically very primitive. One thus cannot justify the view that, for example, a person with "low ego level will not differentiate his notion of self from his ego ideal" because "persons of low level simply do not have that degree of conceptual complexity" (Loevinger, 1976, p. 100).

Recently Kegan (1982) has proposed another model of ego development that relies heavily on Piaget, though his model will not be elaborated here. Kegan has proposed a stage sequence in the evolution of "meaning-making" with considerable depth, though like other models that rely on Kohlberg's theory, he confuses content with process, as when he presumes that people whose morality centers on the good of a larger group are inherently higher level than those with a more particularistic focus (pp. 104-5).<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, his theory offers a number of interesting insights and is part of an exciting new school of thought (see Selman, 1980; and the volume edited by Lee and Noam, 1983) that is attempting to bring together cognitive-developmental and clinical understanding.

From this brief review of approaches to various aspects of personality development, it should be apparent that the concerns of theoreticians interested in the development of narcissism and object relations, morality, and ego processes are clearly related. Theories of ego development and

<sup>1</sup> At other points he implies that the majority of people in the world cannot be intimate (p. 105), or that they lack a sense of self (p. 106).



theories of the development of narcissism and object relations underscore the same movement from an undifferentiated condition to pursuance of need-satisfaction to internalization and true concern for others that is examined by ego psychologists and moral psychologists who posit a shift from preconformist to conformist stages.

My aim in the remaining sections of this chapter is to offer an integrated theory of personality development that synthesizes the important insights of these approaches while avoiding their pitfalls. In particular, the theory will attempt to sketch a portrait of ego and moral development that avoids male-centered or ethnocentric ascription of content to stages and makes liberal use of contemporary research on child development to keep the theory closer to observable data than object relations theories which tend to posit unverifiable stages. In barest outline the theory proposes a movement from a stage in which self and other are not phenomenologically distinct; to a period in which a rudimentary self-concept is evolving but others are important primarily insofar as they fulfill one's needs; to a stage in which morals are increasingly internalized from significant others and the child comes to accept as legitimate the moral beliefs she is learning instead of following them for expedience; to a stage beyond internalization in which the person creates from her own experience values and moral beliefs that seem meaningful and valid. The presentation here will focus on the development of the ego ideal from a morality of self-interest in which the needs of others are secondary, to an internalized morality premised on the subordination of oneself to the higher authority of significant others, to a synthetic or integrative morality based on the recognition of the value and power of both self and others.

### Internal Narcissism

For years psychologists have assumed, along with William James, that the infant's world is a bloomin'; buzzin' confusion. Research on cognitive processes in infants has come to modify that view (for a review, see Cohen, 1979), suggesting that infants are capable of learning quite early in life, and that in the second half of the first year they are able to form nonlinguistic, though relatively abstract concepts (e.g., Cohen and Strauss, 1979).

Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that during the first months of life, reality is dimly perceived and relatively unorganized from the perspective of the infant. In part this reflects limitations in the perceptual apparatus of the baby: infants would likely be unable to discriminate different faces, and certainly facial expressions, in the first month or two solely for perceptual reasons (Souther and Banks, 1979, cited in Sherrod, 1981). Equally significant is the lack of experience and maturation of cognitive

capacities necessary to develop schemas through which to process information. Psychologists since Piaget and Bartlett have recognized the importance of schemas in both constructing and retrieving knowledge, and one need only imagine a condition in which one must construct all knowledge from scratch (with a little help from innate perceptual mechanisms) to grasp the extent to which infancy conforms to James's view. Further, in the earliest months a high percentage of the infant's time is spent in sleep, which limits the capacity to process and organize information.

Somewhere between the third and sixth months, gradual changes become perceptible. At around four months one begins to see differential social smiling, in which the infant smiles more at familiar than unfamiliar faces, suggesting some capacity to store and retrieve information about social stimuli. While the data are not entirely clear because of methodological problems, the weight of evidence suggests that infants cannot discriminate their mothers from strangers until the second quarter of the first year (Olson, 1981). As early as the fourth or fifth month, infants appear to possess rudimentary social expectations, showing signs of distress if their mothers violate expected patterns of social behavior by suddenly becoming silent, expressionless, or seemingly disinterested (Trevarthen, 1977; Oster, 1981).

The first six months' comprise a period in psychic development I will call *primary internal narcissism*. This period shares certain features with Freud's stages of autoeroticism and primary narcissism, though it assumes an infant actively engaged with, and within the limits of its cognitive and perceptual capacities, responsive to its environment (cf. Bast, 1981). Freud, in contrast, assumed that the infant begins life totally withdrawn from its environment and is as satisfied with hallucinatory wish-fulfillment as with satisfaction in reality. In this phase<sup>2</sup> of what will later be described as the stage of internal narcissism, the infant is pleasure-seeking, interested in quelling negative affects that are by and large produced through biological homeostatic mechanisms, and maintaining momentary pleasure, such as the presence of a familiar face or smell. Though in reality the infant is object-related from the start, its phenomenal world is initially, to use the psychoanalytic term, "objectless," which means devoid of stable and retrievable object representations.<sup>3</sup>

A significant feature of primary internal narcissism is the lack of differ-

<sup>1</sup> When I give chronological ages 1 am, of course, speaking only of approximations. The exact age in which a stage occurs is obviously influenced by constitutional and environmental factors.

<sup>2</sup> I use the term "phase" to refer to substages.

<sup>3</sup> A perennial problem in psychoanalytic theorizing is the confusion of objective and subjective perspectives in dealing with object relations. The infant interacts with people from its first days and is thus objectively object-related, though subjectively it cannot yet distinguish self from other or one object from another.



entation of self and other. On this aspect of infantile experience, researchers and theorists of many different persuasions agree (see Ainsworth, 1969). The primary internally narcissistic infant has no concept of self, only a realm of experience, or what Rogers (1959) would call a "phenomenal field." Infants appear to develop differentiated object-representations or person-schemas<sup>1</sup> before they develop coherent self-schemas (Harter, 1983). The reason is fairly obvious: infants interact with different people, and they find the interaction with some more pleasurable or unpleasurable than others. They thus have both cognitive and dynamic reasons to learn to distinguish between people. "Interaction" with self, in contrast, is constant, allowing the illusion that reality and one's experience are identical.

To say that the infant lacks differentiated concepts of self and other is not to imply, as many theorists have, that the infant *confuses* self and other. It is very unlikely that when a three-month-old sees its mother walk away it thinks to itself, "There goes a piece of me." That a five-month-old can recognize specific people certainly suggests the presence of primitive object concepts, however difficult to retrieve. Rather than confusing self and others, the infant appears to lack stable and readily retrievable concepts of a self and of others separate from self. He simply does not process information using these categories because he lacks the ability to step back from himself cognitively in order to see that he and other people are independent animate objects located in space and time, not just here-again-gone-again images in his flow of experience. (For a fascinating application of differentiation notions to the development of gender identity, see Fast, 1978, 1979.)

Beginning somewhere between six and ten months is the phase of *secondary internal narcissism*, which predominates in normal development through twenty-four to forty-eight months. The defining characteristics of secondary internal narcissism are the emergence of primitive self-schemas and the use of others as extensions, mirrors, or tools of the self. Whereas in the primary phase the infant lacks a conception of self, in the secondary phase of internal narcissism self-images have emerged and developed content and boundaries, though frequently unrealistic. In other words, subjective and objective self have begun to converge, albeit only tentatively. As Piaget and Inhelder astutely note, "Freud talked about narcissism but did not sufficiently stress the fact that this was narcissism with a Narcissus"

<sup>1</sup> It would probably make sense to refer to these as "person-schemas" instead of "object representations" to avoid confusion. Both psychoanalytic and Piagetian psychologists refer to "objects," but with different meanings. By "object" Piaget intends any stimulus, animate or inanimate, which is an object of *thought*. The psychoanalytic notion originally meant an object of an instinct, and has gradually come to mean a representation of a stimulus endowed with human characteristics or one that is affectively "cathected."

(1969, p. 22). With secondary internal narcissism, narcissism has found its Narcissus.

Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) argue that the infant's first sense of self is what they call an "existential self," a recognition that she is a causal agent distinct from others with separate actions and thoughts. During the second and third years the child develops a "categorical self," through which she learns to take herself as object and to categorize herself as possessing certain attributes.

The emergence of rudimentary self-schemas is obviously difficult to study empirically because it occurs in preverbal infants, though a sense of agency appears to emerge somewhere in the second half of the first year. The phenomenon of "social referencing," in which a person gauges the safety of a possible action by observing someone else's emotional reaction, arises in the last quarter of the first year, suggesting some degree of self-other differentiation (Klinnert et al., 1983).

The use of self-referent nouns and pronouns provides one index of the development of a sense of self during the second and third years. Self-referent nouns are common in the speech of verbal two-year-olds (Brown, 1973). Use of one's own name exclusively to refer to one's own picture as opposed to those of others is not normative until the end of the second year (Lewis and Brooks, 1978). Interestingly, Bossett (1982) observed that the use of the pronoun "mine" far outstrips use of other self-referent words in the speech of two-year-olds.

Because the ontogenesis of self-schemas is difficult to study empirically, researchers have focused on visual self-recognition as an indicator of the existence of a self-concept. In reality, these researchers only speak to the development of a body-self-concept, if not a visual-body-self-concept (as opposed, for example, to a tactile-body-self-concept, which may emerge somewhat earlier). Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) argue that visual self-recognition occurs in 15- to 18-month-olds and is solidified by 21 to 24 months, though as Bossett (1982) observes, and a perusal of their data suggest, the data support no such conclusions. In a methodologically impeccable study, Bossett (1982) found that visual self-recognition is actually not solidified until sometime in the third year.

The second phase of internal narcissism is the first point at which tension arises between self and other because the infant had previously been unaware of the presence of the other. The infant now accepts the existence, but denies the legitimacy of the other and, particularly toward the beginning of secondary internal narcissism, is unable to understand the complicated goals, motives, and perspectives of significant others (see Bowlby, 1969; Selman, 1980). The child during this period is certainly object-seeking; however, she is still unable to view people as legitimate entities with their own, autonomous existences. The defining characteristic

of internal narcissism, both primary and secondary, is that the individual perceives only her own needs as legitimate. In terms of the ego ideal and moral development, internally narcissistic morality is a function of the child's own desires. Morality, a content of the ego ideal, at this stage is synonymous with the pursuit of pleasure. The infant perceives "the good" as that which is in accordance with her own desires.

The second phase of internal narcissism is the age of Winnicott's (1971) "transitional object." The transitional object, the archetype of which is the teddy bear, is an external object upon which the infant projects her own subjectivity; it is the "intermediate area between the subjective and that which is objectively perceived" (p. 3). Winnicott explains in *Playing and Reality*:

It is not the object, of course, that is transitional. The object represents the infant's transition from a state of being merged with the mother to a state of being in relation to the mother as something outside and separate. (Pp. 14-15)

The realm of the transitional object is that of the secondary internally narcissistic ego, with its incipient subjective awareness of separation from caretakers. It is an early attempt at synthesizing subjectivity and objectivity after the two have become disjoint.

For the child (or the adult for whom aspects of ego development have been arrested) at this stage, people take on many of the characteristics of transitional objects: they function for the child as extensions of self, projections of self, mirrors of self, or tools for gratification. As early as six months the infant will begin to engage its caretakers in communication centered around its activities. Escalona (1968) notes a shift at this point toward more vigorous attempts to elicit and maintain social responses, which indicates, as well, an incipient differentiation of self and other.

Piaget's discussion of the development of symbolic play in early childhood in many ways parallels Winnicott's discussion of transitional phenomena. According to Piaget (Piaget, 1951; Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, pp. 57-63), the first form of play, "exercise play," occurs during the sensorimotor stage and involves repetition or preservation of actions that are in other contexts functional. The second form of play, "symbolic play," occurs especially between the ages of two and six, and it precedes a type of play characterized by objective, socially transmitted rules. "Symbolic play" lies somewhere between Piagetian assimilation and accommodation: it represents a transitional form of activity which in some sense acknowledges the reality of the external world but tailors this reality to the needs of the child. Symbolic play, like the transitional object, lies, to use Winnicott's (1971) phrase, in the "interstitial space" between subjectivity and objectivity.

Piaget contends that around eighteen months, with the move from sensorimotor to preoperational thought (Piaget, 1970), a fundamental change occurs in the relation between self and others:

... there occurs a kind of Copernican revolution, or more simply, a kind of general decentering process whereby the child eventually comes to regard himself as an object among others in a universe that is made up of permanent objects. . . . (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, p.13)

As can readily be seen from the description here of secondary internal narcissism, this phase is as thoroughly cognitive as affective or object relational. Indeed, the processes that lead to and comprise psychic development are so intertwined that to separate the various aspects of development is as implausible and artificial as it is necessary for understanding the various functions and capacities of the mind. As Robert Holt remarks:

... we should not proceed to develop one model for motivation, one to explain memory, and another for each of the traditional divisions of the old elementary texts, in the vain expectation that the unity of observed human functioning will somehow emerge from the joint, even "intercative," operation of these several models. Nature may be orderly, but it is not the creation of an obsessive-compulsive God who created thought one day, motivation another, and saw to it that there were proper boundaries between all such categories. (1976, p. 188)

In a somewhat different language, Piaget expresses the same thought:

There is no behavior pattern, however intellectual, which does not involve affective factors and motives; but, reciprocally, there can be no affective states without the interventions of perceptions or comprehensions which constitute their cognitive structure. Behavior is therefore of a piece, even if the structures do not explain the energetics and if, vice versa, its energetics do not account for its structures. The two aspects, affective and cognitive, are at the same time inseparable and irreducible. (Piaget and Inhelder, p. 158)

The phase of secondary internal narcissism corresponds to Mahler's stage of "separation-individuation" (see Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, 1975), in which the child who is hatching from symbiosis with its mother tries to walk a tightrope between the development of autonomy on the one hand and the fear of aloneness, abandonment, and the regressive pull of merger on the other. In the "practicing" phase of separation-individuation, which Mahler correlates roughly with the period from ten to eighteen months, "the world is the junior toddler's oyster."

... the child seems intoxicated with his own faculties and with the greatness of his own world. Narcissism is at its peak. . . . The chief characteristic of this practicing period is the child's great narcissistic investment in his own functions, his own body, as well as in the objects and objec-

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tives of his expanding "reality." Along with this, we see a relatively great imperviousness to knocks and falls and other frustrations, such as a toy being grabbed by another child. (p. 71)

Psychoanalytic writers frequently attribute to the infant a fantasied sense of "omnipotence" (Freud, 1914; Winnicott, 1971). While the phenomenon to which they are pointing is certainly real, perhaps one would do better to speak of the infant's magical sense of "potency." One has little reason to suppose that infants routinely ignore the myriad cases in which their potency fails, or that all infants reason precisely the same in this regard. One need only observe a healthy two-year-old, however, to understand what psychoanalysts have in mind. The confidence with which the two-year-old will march into a neighbor's house with abandon, literally run circles around its parents, or willfully make its position clear on a wide range of matters can be truly astounding. The experience of a fortunate infant certainly promotes a magical sense of potency.<sup>1</sup> When she closes her eyes, the world gets dark. When she cries, her caretakers come to relieve her distress. The internally narcissistic infant does not recognize that between her actions and parental ministrations is a parent with a will and desires of her own. Empirical evidence documents this magical potency in late infancy. Marvin (cited in Shantz, 1975) found that two- and three-year-olds, unlike children even a year older, tend to insist that through their own power they can make their mothers return. By age four, children might instead respond that they cannot bring their mothers back "but herself can." Developmentally, children tend to attribute agency to themselves before attributing it to others (Watson and Fischer, 1977; Harter, 1983).

Self-other differentiation is incomplete in the secondary internally narcissistic child. During the apogee of this phase children are only beginning to sense that others have their own subjectivities or that the child himself has a private world of experience. Maccoby (1980) gives the example of the two-year-old who complains that her milk is not cold enough. When her mother protests that she just took the milk from the refrigerator, the little girl takes another sip and says, "See, it is warm!" (p. 262). This is similar to the three-year-old who covers her eyes and says, "You can't see

<sup>1</sup> The infant who is fortunate enough to experience this illusory potency or "omnipotence" develops what Erikson (1963) has called a sense of "basic trust" or Lang (1959) has termed "primary ontological security," a sense that his needs will be met through his own actions and those of others. For the infant who is not so fortunate, matters are quite different. To preserve a sense of safety in an untrustworthy environment, the infant or young child may defensively distort his sense of impotence to a view of total omnipotent control, withdraw into apathy and depression, develop an expectation that to survive he must take everything he can and avoid contact with people, or internalize primitively construed abusive "introjects" while simultaneously idealizing them and pretending they are benevolent.

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me." As these examples suggest, ego development is intertwined with cognitive development, though neither is reducible to the other.

Similarly, as Vygotsky (1934) observes, it is not until three-and-a-half or four that the child begins speaking for others instead of producing egocentric monologues, and Piaget notes that egocentric language persists through age six (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). This gradual change to truly social communication is both cognitive and object relational, representing both the ability to understand the listener's point of view and the *concern* for the listener's point of view.

As early as fourteen to twenty months the child, in what Sander (1975) refers to as the "self-assertion" stage of infant-mother interaction, comes to develop goals independent of, and often in opposition to his mother's wishes. This is the origin of moral conflict (i.e., the conflict between competing interests), and the internally narcissistic moral view resolves this conflict in favor of impulse. In other words, gratification is the *summum bonum*, so that the child responds primarily to conditioning or restraint.

The child does not come to recognize the existence of the private thoughts and desires of self and others until the third or fourth year. Research by Flavell and his colleagues (cited in Harter, 1983) documents that children begin to realize around age three that they have a private realm of thoughts that others cannot observe. Harter and Barnes (cited in Harter, 1983) found that three- and four-year-old children have difficulty differentiating their own emotions from those of their parents and that they cannot separate the causes of their emotions from the causes of their parents' emotions (e.g., "Daddy would be sad if he couldn't stay up and watch 'Hulk' on television"). By age three, children attribute intentions and motives to other people (Keasey, 1978), though whether they also attribute these to inanimate objects is unclear (Gelman and Spelke, 1981).

The child's gradual development of a sense of self, potency, and separateness from others is probably best chronicled by Mahler, particularly in her description of the period of "rapprochement" which she claims generally occurs between fifteen and twenty-four months (Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, 1975). During this period the child manifests an incipient fear of loss of love but retains much of his or her "anal" negativism (1975, pp. 76-7). According to Mahler and her colleagues, children during this period display two contradictory behavioral patterns: "... the 'shadowing' [inconstant watching and following] of mother and the darting away from her, with the expectation of being chased and swept into her arms," which Mahler takes to indicate "both his wish for reunion with the love object and his fear of reengulfment by it" (p. 77).

The toddler is coming to differentiate self from others (p. 78), and that

every child Mahler observed experienced stranger anxiety during this period (p. 77) attests to the powerful psychic impact of the realization that, not only can others exist independently of the child, but that they can exert power over him as well. "The junior toddler gradually realizes that his love objects (his parents) are separate individuals with their own personal interests" (p. 79). The child for the first time recognizes that his wishes are not identical with those of his mother (p. 90). Whereas previously the child used the mother as a haven or "home base" for emotional "refueling," his incipient awareness of her separate desires and existence finds behavioral expression in his "continual bringing of things to mother, filling her lap with objects that he had found in his expanding world" (p. 90). The mother at this stage is gradually changing for the child, from transitional object to idealized love object. The toddler often expects the mother magically to read his thoughts and fulfill his wishes (p. 95).

Characteristic of this period are indecisiveness, ambivalence, and rapid mood swings (pp. 95-6). Mahler describes the central conflict of this age, which Erikson (1963) has so aptly designated "autonomy versus shame and doubt:"

Around 18 months our toddlers seemed quite eager to exercise their rapidly growing autonomy to the hilt. Increasingly, they chose not to be reminded that at times they could not manage on their own. Conflicts ensued that seemed to hinge upon the desire to be separate, grand, and omnipotent, on the one hand, and to have mother magically fulfill their wishes, without their having to recognize that help was actually coming from the outside, on the other. (Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, p. 95)

Mahler nicely elucidates the affective side of the cognitive capacity to separate self from other, observing that children in the period of rapprochement seek independence and autonomy as well as fear separateness, as evidenced in rapidly alternating efforts to push the mother away and to cling to her. This suggests, as well, the conflict the child is experiencing between the desire for separateness and potency and the continued set of feelings and behaviors generally described as "attachment." Another side of this is a swing between undervaluation and devaluation of the self, between omnipotence and impotence, and a similar oscillation regarding others. This is the age Kernberg views as involving the splitting of all-good and all-bad self- and object-representations.

### External Narcissism

The shift from parents as transitional objects (or in Kohut's evocative terminology, "selfobjects," 1977) to objects with an independent existence is gradual and subtle and is evidence of the emergence of the second stage of processes in the development of personality and moral judgment which


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will here be called *external narcissism*.<sup>1</sup> Two interrelated events mark the emergence of external narcissism, which begins some time between three and five years, and is generally consolidated during preadolescence or adolescence.<sup>2</sup> The first involves object relations and social cognition, and the second involves the form of moral judgment, though the two are intertwined. First, the person not only becomes capable of more fully understanding the wishes and feelings of other people, but she or he comes to *value* the interests of significant others. Secondly, the meaning of "the good" changes from need-satisfaction to values and standards of behavior internalized from significant others. Whereas in internal narcissism the child's wishes and desires serve as the basis of his morality, in external narcissism the morals and ideals of significant others begin to function as ego ideal set-goals, an ideal self starts to emerge, and the individual must base her self-esteem on the capacity to achieve *externally* derived ideal standards.

The first aspect of the emergence of external narcissism has been described by psychoanalytic theorists variously as the development of whole objects or total objects, object constancy (Kernberg, 1976), libidinal object constancy (Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, 1975), and true object love. One must be cautious in using terms such as these which have acquired over the

<sup>1</sup> By "narcissism" I mean the belief in the value and power of the self, regardless of whether that narcissism occurs or is sustained through lack of differentiation, primitive defenses, identification with powerful others, or other normal and pathological mechanisms. I could just as easily have named the stages without reference to narcissism, though I chose to do so to emphasize continuity with models of narcissism and object relations.

<sup>2</sup> My unwillingness to pinpoint ages precisely stems less from the desire to evade falsification than from two issues, one empirical and the other conceptual. First, developmental variability across individuals and cultures is so great that one simply cannot propose absolute ages. Secondly, the conceptualization of "stages" proposed here, which views them as waxing and waning processes used to fulfill certain functions, suggests a different model of change than in either a continuity or a discontinuity model of personality development. Rather than development being easily represented graphically by a straight line from the origin with a slope of one, as in a model of continuous linear development, or as a series of linear progressions with steep slopes punctuated by long plateaus, as in a discontinuity model (with stage transitions best illustrated by sudden spurts of growth), this conceptualization views stages as sets of processes conceived as sudden spurts of growth; this conceptualization views stage largely being negative as a new stage emerges. Transitions are represented as areas of overlap, where one set of processes recedes and another develops, so that one cannot unambiguously point to an age and correlate it with a particular stage. These different models of growth may be illustrated as follows:



years many, and often inconsistent meanings. "Whole objects" is a good example. Whole objects are usually juxtaposed with part-objects, which are representations of isolated aspects of a person. The problem is that some have meant by this distinction something very concrete, namely the representation of mother *qua* mother instead of breast, while others have intended something more general and metaphorical, namely the ability to love an object in itself instead of loving it solely for its need-gratifying aspects. The former occurs quite early, certainly by eighteen months if not much sooner, while the latter tends not to be solidified until five or six. A third meaning of "whole objects" is the ability to store and retrieve a single representation of an object that is both frustrating and gratifying.

The emergence of externally narcissistic processes occurs in the period described by Kernberg as the consolidation of self- and object-representations and psychic structure and by Kohut as the stage in which a cohesive self has emerged. The first aspect of this development involves a gradual shift from use of others as transitional objects or tools of gratification to the recognition and valuing of autonomous others. While this shift is not primarily cognitive, in that it entails a change in valuation of others and not just understanding of them, it is certainly connected with, and dependent upon cognitive development. It relies, for example, upon the development of empathy, which Hoffman (1979, 1980) has masterfully traced from primitive conditioning and contagion in infancy to more complex affectively and cognitively mediated distress and understanding of others' internal states in older children and adults.

It also rests upon the development of "role taking" (for a review, see Higgins, 1981) or "perspective taking" (Selman, 1980) capabilities through which a person comes to understand others' psychological experience. In a methodologically diverse and exquisite programme of research, Selman (1980) has attempted to chart the development of perspective taking through five periods. The first is undifferentiated and egocentric perspective taking which roughly corresponds to ages three to six. (Selman does not examine perspective taking in children younger than three years of age.) At this level the child distinguishes self from other physically but not psychologically and is unable to separate subjective feelings from objective reality. The second stage is one of "subjective perspective taking," in which the child forms relatively simple conceptualizations of others, and attributes an illusory observability and unity to their thoughts and feelings. The child cannot, at this developmental juncture, recognize ambivalence in others.

In the third, "self-reflective" stage, the child is able to take the perspective of another person. At the fourth level, the young adolescent can step back from both her own perspective and the perspective of concrete others to take a more objective, third-person approach that integrates multiple perspectives. Finally, in the fifth stage, the person is fully aware of the

distinction between self-presentational appearance and psychic reality, is able to form complex object representations, including the existence of unconscious motivational processes. (For an excellent summary of related research on the development of social cognition, see Shantz, 1975.)

The second aspect of the emergence of externally narcissistic processes is that alongside a differentiation of self-schemas from ideal self-schemas is a change in the form of morality or sense of "the good." The criterion of need-satisfaction recedes as the standard of good and evil and is replaced by "internalized" standards. "Internalization" is another one of those constructs that should not be used without explicitly stating what one means. It is an omnibus term in psychoanalysis that does not draw certain very important distinctions. One such distinction, which has often been ignored because of the ambiguous place of object relations concepts in the Freudian structural model, is between object representation and identification. If one conceives of cognition as an ego function, then any mental representation or schema is "internalized into the ego." Yet this is an altogether different phenomenon from the internalization process Freud described in "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917) through which a person makes a lost object part of himself (e.g., takes on many of its characteristics) and thus incorporates the object "into the ego." Freud himself failed to distinguish the cognitions people form of significant others from the internalizations that in part constitute the ego and superego.

One can distinguish several distinct phenomena through which aspects of an object or ideal are "internalized." The first is object representation, or the formation of a person-schema, in which the individual forms a cognitive representation of the object. The second is modeling (Bandura, 1977), in which the person develops the competence to imitate some aspect of the object's behavior. The third is internalization of function, in which behaviors or attitudes of the object or aspects of the relationship with the object are replaced by self-regulatory ego functions, such as the ability to restrain oneself from tempting but dangerous acts or the regulation of self-esteem (see Reich, 1960). In other words, the person develops the capacity to carry out intrapsychically a function previously fulfilled by the object. Anna Freud (cited in Maccoby, 1980) provides an excellent example of this phenomenon:

A little girl, just two years old, had always been put to bed by her mother, and there was a familiar bed-time routine. For the first time, the mother was away over night, and the child was being put to bed by a baby-sitter. The child had great difficulty going to sleep, and even though she was very tired, kept her eyes open after she was tucked in and the sitter had tipped out of the room. Through the open door, the sitter hears the child say, imitating her mother's voice: "Goodnight my dearest." (Pp. 14-15)

One could consider internalization of function a subcategory of modeling, in which the "behavior" being modeled is intrapsychic, i.e., a mental operation.

A fourth process is moral internalization, in which injunctions are established as moral standards and values are learned and accepted. Fifth, and often related, is the formation of ideal self-schemas, both moral and nonmoral. At the most primitive levels these may be idealized and distorted self-schemas or object representations (or what psychoanalysts call "introjects"). Finally, the person may alter self-schemas or self-concept to accommodate representations of idealized objects or ideal self.

The relationship between these processes is complex and has never been adequately elucidated. For example, partly in the service of affect and partly for strictly cognitive reasons, people form schemas of significant others. The nature of social schemas and the cognitive distortions involved in social information processing have been studied at length by social cognition researchers (see, e.g., Nisbett and Ross, 1980). The nature of representations of other people has also been a focus of object relations theory in psychoanalysis. In psychoanalytic metapsychology the place of such representations is ambiguous. As noted earlier, object representations have frequently been viewed as "internalizations" in the ego or superego. A child can, however, form a schema of her father without internalizing her father or his attributes as an ideal. Inadequacies in social information processing (e.g., in the formation of object representations) invariably affect moral internalizations: a child with a schema of a parent which is distorted for cognitive or motivational reasons will necessarily form problematic ego ideal internalizations when introjecting distorted images of the parent as moral internalizations. This is an area in which one must bear in mind the warning of cognitive-developmental theorists from Piaget onward that moral "internalizations" always involve active cognitive processing by the child and are never perfect representations of parental demands or attributes.

The phenomenon one may properly call identification is actually a composite of several of these processes. First, the child must form a cognitive representation of the object or the aspect of the object with which he is identifying. A second process involves the setting up of this object or attribute as an ego ideal set-goal that establishes a standard to be attained. Thirdly, the child imitates the desired attribute or behavior, trying to make himself more like the object. Finally, he adjusts his self-concept or specific self-schemas to reflect the altered ideal and behavior. This will often, additionally, involve a defensive distortion of self-schemas to allow the child the sense that she or he actually is like the parent or object of identification.

Disentangling these various processes also allows one to distinguish be-

tween modeling and identification. Bandura (1977) has argued that we should jettison the concept of identification and replace it with the more observable notion of modeling or imitation. In contrast, psychoanalytic psychologists usually use the term "identification" to refer to any occasion in which a person appropriates the thoughts, feelings, or behavior of someone else, usually an authority figure. As opposed to either of these two views, the present approach suggests a useful distinction between modeling and identification: modeling means cognitively mediated imitation, whereas identification refers to a process in which modeling of behaviors or attributes is motivated by the establishment of the object or attributes as an ideal, and in which the person expects to gain pleasure or reduce displeasure by adjusting self-schemas accordingly. In other words, whereas modeling usually occurs in many situations as a way to produce appropriate responses in the absence of direct reinforcement, identification involves the alteration of ideal self-images as well as self-images relevant to those ideals.

All identification thus has a component of modeling, but all modeling does not entail identification. The distinction between the two is clearest regarding the internalization of moral beliefs. Modeling of self-abnegatory rules would not occur without identification because direct conditioning would override it. Such rules are, however, internalized through identificatory processes because acting or believing like the parent is itself rewarding, since it allows one to fulfill an ideal of becoming like the idealized object. With identification, unlike nonidentificatory modeling, the reward or "reinforcement" is in the process itself, not in the potential to produce more suitable behavior in the modeled domain. When the little boy imitates his father shaving, he does not do so because he knows that ten years later he will benefit from having practiced shaving as a child; he does so because being like his father is pleasurable.

This all raises the question of why the externally narcissistic child identifies with parents at all and comes to accept their moral views as legitimate. I will propose three mechanisms through which this can occur. In so doing I will not hypothesize that every child identifies for precisely the same combination of reasons to the same degree. It is time that the psychodynamic understanding of development move away from nomothetic accounts of allegedly universal phenomenology to a greater recognition that one must be extremely cautious in ascribing particular thoughts to "the Oedipal age boy," "the child," or the like. For example, before doing clinical work I suspected that the psychoanalytic notion of "penis envy" was a flight of Freudian fancy, an ideological projection of culturally constructed and learned beliefs about male superiority. In reading clinical accounts of penis envy, in which anger at men or jealousy of various privileges granted to males in Western society were interpreted as manifestations of penis envy, I was convinced that clinical data were being too



readily assimilated into theoretical constructs, which indeed, they often are. I was therefore rather surprised when a female patient, in the context of discussing her revulsion for women and her sense of their profound inferiority, described her early sense of her body as missing something. In psychotherapy one does, in fact, come across penis envy of this sort, and when one thinks about the concreteness of childhood cognition, it is not surprising that a little girl who sees her brother getting advantages because of his sex may view the source of her misfortune as a missing penis. Yet we have no reason to suppose that "the generic girl" — i.e., every girl — undergoes precisely the same experiences and thought processes to develop a view that women are inferior, that their inferiority stems from a physical defect, that mother was responsible for the child's defectiveness, and therefore that father is to be loved. Many little girls have not seen male genitals yet nevertheless develop conscience, and it is certainly to be expected that of those girls who unconsciously view the vagina as a defect or a wound (which many do), an equal number are likely to blame the father for it as the mother, since the father, unlike the mother, appears to be intact. The point of this is not that we should abandon nomothetic accounts and focus exclusively on individual differences. Rather, we should be careful in causally attributing phenomena such as conscience, which are nearly universal and appear in people with vastly differing capacities for complex symbolization, to complicated and individually highly variable mental processes.

The first reason for identification, and probably the most important, relates to the maintenance of self-esteem. When the child has matured cognitively to the point at which he must begin to relinquish the magical sense of potency of infancy and to recognize his inferiority with respect to his parents, he can regain or maintain a sense of his own power and value by becoming like someone who appears all-powerful and all-valuable. He thus begins to establish moral demands and ideal self-images that become set-goals to which he must aspire. Adler emphasized the child's sense of inferiority with respect to his parents, and Freud offered a hypothesis very similar to that proposed here several years before he came to believe in the origin of the superego through resolution of the Oedipus complex. In his essay on narcissism (1914) he argued that with the move away from narcissism and the formation of an ego ideal, the child trades his illusory infantile omnipotence for the worship of a new ideal. One need not suppose that the infant has a sense of omnipotence for this mechanism to operate. Rather, the infant does appear to have a magical sense of potency, and with cognitive development, he forms goals or wished-for self-images that he now realizes are beyond his capacities.

Ausubel (1952) has described the process through which the infant relinquishes an hypothesized infantile omnipotence for what he nicely calls "satellization," in which the child is "relieved of the burden of justifying

his adequacy on the basis of actual performance ability" by identifying with seemingly omnipotent parents. In so doing he shares in their magnificence much as "the retainers of a powerful potentate would revel in the glory of their liege" (pp. 57-8). Ausubel argues that satellization proceeds from a "devaluation crisis," in which the child begins to realize that his parents are fulfilling his needs because they, as autonomous beings, *want* to and that getting what one wants depends upon the executive abilities possessed by adults (Ausubel, 1958). Satellization will not occur appropriately if the child is rejected by the parents or valued only for achievements in which the parents can bask (cf. Freud's essay on "those wrecked by success" and the "exceptions," 1916, and Jacobson's elaboration of it, 1959).

One of the implications of Ausubel's view is that the child gains enhanced self-esteem simply by feeling like part of his parent or his parent's entourage, without even having to adjust his behavior. In other words, by redefining his self-schemas to include a likeness or relationship to a parent or parents, the child attains set-goals of being like these omnipotent, omniscient beings. This has implications for cross-cultural study of the self-system and self-esteem as well, because in cultures in which the individual is not considered a separate unit apart from significant others, self-esteem is less likely to depend as much upon factors such as individual competence, morality, etc., and more upon the status of relevant groups or fulfillment of group ideals. This phenomenon is not limited to non-Western societies and can be seen both in the behavior of children, who revel in their parents' successes because they identify with parents, and in the experience of people whose identity prominently includes significant others, so that, for example, a housewife may feel bad about herself when her husband must accept a low-status job or proves incompetent at work.

Kohut (1971, 1977) has elegantly described the shift from internal to external narcissism examined by Ausubel in terms of devaluation and satellization in a way informed by clinical observation of adults with borderline and narcissistic pathology rooted in this developmental era. This is the period of transition from a fragmented self to a cohesive self and the emergence of a grandiose self and an idealized parent imago.<sup>1</sup> One could argue that a grandiose self has roots in an infantile sense of potency but is then defensively elaborated with the growing recognition of lack of power and control. The child thus develops an image of himself as able to do anything, to stand alone, to surmount all odds. The idealized parent imago gradually emerges from parental selfobjects (i.e., transitional objects that serve as extensions of self) and later becomes incorporated into what I am

<sup>1</sup> The orthodox Kohutian will, I hope, forgive me if I extend Kohut's ideas somewhat, using them as transitional objects with which to play and mingle my own thoughts.



calling here the ego ideal. Grandiose self and idealized parent image(s) both become established as aspects of ideal self, and with development the child both tones down these omnipotent fantasies and learns to tolerate greater discrepancies between ideals and self-image.<sup>1</sup>

A second source of identification and idealization of parental figures is the need for security. Both Ausubel and Maslow (1954) have pointed to the need for security in the formation of idealized "omnipotent parent" schemas. If the child is to maintain basic trust after recognizing his relative powerlessness, he must be able to put his faith in what one might call a *benevolent other* in whose hands he must put his very existence. The inability to maintain this trust in a benevolent other—whether because the child's affective life is constitutionally so intense that others seem incapable of keeping one safe and satisfied, because those upon whom he relies are so defective in some respect that identification is problematic, or because of experiential or environmental factors such as chronic infantile and childhood illness—can be psychologically devastating. This is observable in the most extreme form in the experience of infants who grew up without nurturance or attachment in sterile foundling homes as first described by Spitz as "hospitalism" (1946).<sup>2</sup> It is also central to the experience of people with profound character pathology and is manifest in a transference frequently filled with fears of rejection or abandonment, intense longing for a benevolent other (or, as a patient once called me, "my protector") juxtaposed with a tremendous fear of attachment, themes of poorly differentiated victims and victimizers, and an alternating sense of one's own dangerousness and unworthiness and the dangerousness and unworthiness of significant others. The child in such a position will generally both reject identification and withdraw into fantasies of secure aloneness on the one

<sup>1</sup> Kohut argues that one of these two "poles" of the "self" can often compensate for defects in the other. One can readily see how serious difficulty with either grandiose self or idealized parent image(s) could lead to serious pathology. If the child cannot develop a sense of himself as competent, powerful, and valuable in the face of recognition of limitations, he is likely chronically to devalue himself or defensively to create a self-image of total grandeur, which is the psychic complement to extreme devaluation. The result is likely to be an over-dependence on others or an intense need for "narcissistic supplies" from devalued others. Difficulty forming an image of idealized parent figures will result in an inability to identify and consequently in what Kohut calls "missing segments" of psychic structure, the continuation of a morality of need-satisfaction, and a falling back upon a grandiose self-concept that is fragile in the face of cognitive development. In people with borderline pathology one frequently sees defects in both "poles," so that the person oscillates between intense need for an unambivalently positive, idealized object of identification and a fiercely independent stance as a person who needs no one, who can satisfy his own needs and will do so because no one else is to be trusted.

<sup>2</sup> While there has been some controversy about whether psychological deficits in such children stem largely from affective factors relating to attachment or simply from lack of stimulation, recent evidence quite clearly demonstrates the profound impact on character of lack of adequate figures of attachment even in children who received adequate stimulation (Tizard and Hodges, 1978).

hand, and identify with primitive hostile "introjects" who must be abusing him because he deserves the abuse on the other. The result of an inability to believe in and identify with a benevolent other is what one might call (to appropriate Sullivan's term, 1953) a "malevolent transformation" of the object world. Later experience of intense and disorganizing affect will often cause a regressive activation of these primitive schemas.

The identification process that establishes an externally narcissistic ego ideal and forces the child to relinquish need-satisfaction as his highest good is the most important form of a more general mechanism that underlies much of modeling, moral internalization, and identification, which entails the internalization of objects and behaviors that one desires for oneself but does not possess. This mechanism encompasses both the learning of adaptive modeled behaviors (including "internal behaviors") and identification with those whose status one envies (cf. Whiting, Kluckhohn, and Anthony's "status envy" hypothesis of identification, 1958). It underlies both the massive internalizations that result in the formation of conscience and later identifications with significant others, cultural heroes, and the like. The logic of this process is quite simple: if someone has something you want or knows something you want to know, watch that person and copy the behavior; and if someone is tremendously powerful and valuable, make yourself like him or her, and you are likely to become more powerful and valuable (or at least to have the pleasure of thinking you are).

The third factor promoting identification and the internalization of moral rules is cognitively mediated conditioning and social learning. The child learns to expect punishment for particular actions and rewards for others, and she discovers that she can optimize emotion by following certain maxims. This explanation, incidentally, encompasses Freud's castration hypothesis, which asserts that the boy actively represses Oedipal wishes to avoid castration or allay fears of it. Gender identifications and gender-appropriate Oedipal object choice also stems from social learning: the child learns that certain behaviors are appropriate for members of her or his sex, and also that one can gain pleasure from being, for example, coy in relationships with members of the opposite sex, particularly the opposite sex parent.

The wish to avoid painful affects and attain pleasurable ones is an important source of moral development which can explain why the child learns certain prudential rules and performs certain actions in order to gain approval. What it cannot explain is why she or he considers these rules morally correct as opposed to practically useful, often obeys them in the absence of a watchful parental eye, and identifies with the parents as the idealized authorities whose notions of good and bad are as objective as the rising and setting of the sun. If moral internalization were strictly a function of conditioning or social learning, people would come to believe in a totally situation-specific morality, in which one need never experience guilt

and only need be upset if one breaks rules and gets caught. In reality, however, most people beyond the age of seven or eight do not simply regard moral injunctions as convenient rules of thumb to maximize self-interest (Kant, in fact, specifically defined such maxims as outside the bounds of morality): they view them as standards of behavior that give meaning to their lives and transcend self-interest. The trauma—and the achievement—which the child experiences during this period is that he must trade his own potency or “omnipotence” for that of his parents. In so doing he must submit to their morality, but in return he receives a new form of power and value, an external narcissism. The internalization of moral values thus involves a shift in the perceived locus of power and value. The internally narcissistic person tries to incorporate others into his orbit; the externally narcissistic person has become a satellite in the orbit of significant others.

Whereas the internally narcissistic person attempts to externalize the internal, to make the subjective objective, the externally narcissistic person attempts to internalize the external, to make the objective subjective. To put the matter differently, the internally narcissistic individual views external reality and external objects as extensions or mirrors of himself. The externally narcissistic individual, in contrast, perceives himself as an extension or mirror of external reality (of an external object, e.g., parent, family, or society). External narcissism has, to date, been the norm in all human cultures and is illustrated in its most extreme form by the soldier who gives his life for his country, perceiving his own body as an agent of the group or state.

From an ego-psychological point of view, the shift to external narcissism is the central dynamic operating during the “Oedipal” years. Certainly Oedipal issues are significant in most, if not all cultures, and particularly those with nuclear families. The Oedipus complex is not, however, solely an aspect of psychosexual development; it is also one facet of the gradual relinquishment of infantile power, value, and centrality— affectively complementary to Piagetian cognitive “decentering”—which occurs sometime between late infancy and late childhood.

I should make absolutely clear that I am not therefore arguing for the nonexistence or unimportance of the Oedipus complex, which no one who does clinical work with his eyes open could possibly do. Rather, I am making two more specific arguments. First, the Oedipus complex is not responsible for the bulk of moral internalizations. Aside from the strictly sexual aspects of the Oedipus complex, the recognition that one cannot possess the desired parent is an aspect of a broader recognition in early childhood that one cannot have everything one wants, and that if one wishes to have the love or privileges of significant others one must accommodate oneself to a world that is not under one's magical control.

Secondly, I am arguing that the time has come for psychodynamic psychologists to recognize what has gradually become apparent since the development of ego psychology but which no one has been willing to say: that the development of personality involves the maturation of various ego processes (including cognition, social cognition, self-representation, ego ideal formation, and understanding and modulation of affects), and that what Freud called psychosexual development is only a developmental line, albeit an important one. The schemas a person forms about sexuality originate in childhood, and later information is processed through those schemas unless the schemas accommodate to new information. Such accommodation may not obliterate early affective responses that remain attached to cognitive representations or symbols, even when the representations themselves undergo various transformations. These schemas interact with, but are not isomorphic with the various schemas and scripts (Abelson, 1981) a person forms in interaction with early parental objects. All problems with authority are not, after all, problems with Oedipal authority; all anxiety is not castration anxiety; all envy is not penis envy; all conflicts do not surround sexual gratification or the need to discharge pent-up aggressive energy; and all psychological development is not born of conflict.

External narcissism develops in two phases. First, at the inception of external narcissism, the child has formed schemas of “bad me,” “good me,” and the like, and he has constructed primitive schemas of parental rules that are used in the service of avoiding punishment and gaining rewards. This phase roughly corresponds to Kohlberg's pre-conventional level. The child at this point obeys parental commandments, but they are not, in large measure, the “child's own.” They are expedient but not morally obligatory. Characteristic of this phase is what Piaget calls “moral realism” (1965), the belief that punishment “naturally” follows a “bad action. For the young child, Loevinger observes, “physical principles, psychological principles, and moral necessity” are largely indistinguishable (1976b, p. 287). This is the period Loevinger describes as the beginning of the “conformist” stage, and the epoch Kegan (1982) labels the “imperial” stage, in which the child has learned to take her own impulses as an object of thought and therefore to be able to control them. Being “bad” at this stage is experienced primarily in terms of fear of punishment and shame, though one begins to see the rudiments of guilt.

During the second phase, which usually begins in middle to late childhood, conscience becomes fully developed as the child comes to believe in the morals she is internalizing, irrespective of their hedonic value. Research by Harter (1983) suggests that children do not often experience shame in the absence of another person until middle childhood (around age eight). While rudimentary guilt experiences have been observed in children as

young as two (Zann-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, and King, 1979) and appear to be important in early object relations (if one can cautiously use reconstructions from adulthood as data), full guilt responses generally do not emerge until around six years (Hoffman, 1979).

The ability to experience guilt and internalize moral values to which one is committed relies upon a number of cognitive-affective developments, such as the greater organization and coherence of self-schemas, the development of ideal self-schemas, the ability to tolerate discrepancies between ideal self and self-concept so that one can develop what psychoanalysts call an "observing ego" which allows one to observe oneself even in the face of painful affect, the ability to regulate affect more successfully so that guilt is not disorganizing and an observing ego is capable of operating, and the continued evolution of perspective-taking skills.

Ample evidence suggests that children's self-schemas begin concrete and gradually become more abstract as they grow older (Livesley and Bromley, 1973; Bannister and Agnew, 1977; Montemayor and Eisen, 1977; Harter, 1983), which fits well with the kind of developmental sequence posited by Piaget for nonsocial cognition. Harter (1983) has nicely applied Piagetian theory to the development of self-schemas. The preoperational child, she contends, would not be troubled by logical contradictions between perceived attributes of self and would not show hierarchical ordering of self-images. With the transition to concrete operations (roughly between ages five and eight), self-images would become hierarchically classified and logically related, though they would continue to focus primarily on concrete, observable details. Formal operations brings the ability to think abstractly about oneself and one's attributes and mental processes.

A coherently structured set of ideal self-images also emerges during the second phase of external narcissism, superseding the unsystematically organized and activated ideal self set-goals of earlier years. Older children are also more capable of preventing wished-for self-images from distorting self-images beyond recognition. Studies by Ruble and her colleagues (summarized in Ruble and Rholes, 1981) demonstrate that young children's self-attributions are significantly positively biased and are relatively independent of actual success or failure. This is a good illustration of the interaction of cognitive, affective, and defensive processes: the child's inability to reality-test about her own abilities is certainly a cognitive deficit, but it is motivated or maintained beyond its strictly cognitive-developmental basis to avoid unpleasant affect. One can thus see how the development of more mature ways of regulating emotion (in this case, defenses) is intimately related to social-cognitive development, moral development, development of self-system and ideal self, and personality development more generally.

In terms of moral development, in the second phase of external narcissism

the person's morality is aptly characterized by Kohlberg's appellation of "conventional." This is the period of the entrenchment of the agency Freud described as the superego. The person in this phase holds many specific and unsystematic moral beliefs internalized from parents and others, but he also has learned more general principles and categories of moral judgment that he can apply to given situations. In addition, Sullivan describes the emergence of "supervisory patterns" at this time that remain for life (1953, pp. 239-40). These are internal "personifications" (e.g., "the hearer," "the spectator") who perform the functions of self-observation and editing of behavior and self-presentation in order to preserve self-esteem and the respect of others. Thus, alongside the development of ideal self-images, conscience, and recognition of what others are thinking comes a concern with self-presentation. Several studies summarized by Hauser (1976, p. 931) suggest that most American adults function at the level of secondary external narcissism. Depending on culture and circumstance, the orientation of the person in either phase of external narcissism, but particularly in the second, may be primarily toward pleasing authorities, conforming to peers, or supporting the larger community and upholding its rules. Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner (1976) have articulately described the way environmental factors can influence these orientations.

In the latter part of the second phase of external narcissism the person frequently selectively identifies with the values, ideals, beliefs, and attributes of nonparental significant others. Particularly in pluralistic Western cultures, during the latter part of this phase the person may experience conflicting internalizations, such as the conflict between earlier moral beliefs and ideal self-images and those of peer groups counter to parental or societal values. Part III will more thoroughly examine the relationship between culture, social change, and the phenomenon one might call ego ideal splits, in which the person is torn between conflicting value systems.

The most ontogenetically primitive externally narcissistic ego ideal often corresponds to the severe, punitive, self-abnegatory superego described in many clinical accounts. Adolescent personality development in some cultures may require in part the distanciation from, and working-through of these earliest introjects and prohibitions. One way this process may be carried out is through replacement of early objects of identification by nonparental, often peer identifications. Peter Blos describes the use of peer internalizations in the process of differentiation in adolescence:

... the group shares and thus alleviates individual guilt feelings that accompany the emancipation from childhood dependencies, prohibitions, and loyalties . . . Contemporaries ease the way to membership in the new generation within which the adolescent has to establish his social, personal, and sexual identity. Whenever peer relationships simply replace childhood dependencies, then the group has miscarried its function. In

such cases, the adolescent process has been short-circuited with the result that unresolved emotional dependences are made permanent personality attributes. (1967, pp. 177-8)

As Blos's analysis makes clear, adherence to ideals internalized from others is still external narcissism, whether the new objects of identification are parental or otherwise. Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) contend in "The Adolescent as a Philosopher" that identity crises and relativistic notions can occur in individuals who are still conventionally moral. The "counterculture" of the 1960s, they argue, required an old form (submission) with a new content (rebellion); the adolescent merely obeyed a different external object.

### Synthetic Narcissism

Internal narcissism as a stage of personality development is characterized by an equivalence of "the good" with "good for me." The internally narcissistic standard of right and wrong is gratification. With external narcissism, the source of morality is an externally imposed set of standards. The externally narcissistic conception of "the good" is "the good as I understand significant others to define it." Externally narcissistic morality is a standard against which one judges one's actions, a standard that frequently conflicts with the standard of gratification. The final stage in personality and moral development is *synthetic narcissism*, which may provide the final form, though not necessarily the final content of the ego ideal. The *form* of the ego ideal is its developmental level, e.g., external narcissism; the *content* is the particular set of values, moral beliefs, and ideal self-images at a given time. The synthetically narcissistic ego ideal contains a personal philosophy or ethic, an original, synthetic reconciliation of self and other. It represents neither a grandiose return to infantile narcissism nor an overvaluation of others, as in external narcissism. Synthetic narcissistic processes rest upon a mutual potency self and other.<sup>1</sup> The synthetically narcissistic ego ideal insures that the Kantian categorical imperative is extended to oneself. Neither self nor others may consistently be treated only as means to an end, though the particular balancing act (i.e., the content of the moral system) is idiosyncratic and not prescribable by any theory of personality growth or "maturity."

<sup>1</sup> One should note, in addition, that synthetic narcissism involves the recognition of realistic limits on the potency of both self and other. Whereas the internally narcissistic person overvalues his own wishes, value, and/or power, the externally narcissistic individual attributes too much power and value to parents or society. Synthetic narcissism represents a more realistic view of human power and its limits. I should point out, as well, that by "synthetic" I am referring to the synthesis of values and ideals that occurs with this stage and to the dialectical process of transcending internal and external narcissism. I do not intend by "synthetic" any connotation of artificiality.

### Development of Personality

The phase of the emergence of synthetic narcissistic processes may sometimes correspond to Kenneth Keniston's (1968, 1970) concept of "youth," in which the individual is psychologically, but not sociologically adult. The youth has worked through many of his childhood conflicts; however, he is unable or unwilling to come to terms with his society and its institutions. For Keniston this is not a pathological development but often a healthy source of social change (1968). One could argue that in youth the individual differentiates from her society in a manner parallel to the differentiation of the adolescent from domestic (parental) society. According to Keniston, the youth is not immature. On the contrary, the synthesis which the individual may achieve upon the resolution of this stage represents a healthy, realistic reconciliation of self and society, in which the "relatedness yet separateness of both is affirmed" (1970, p. 642). He adds,

Thus the "resolution" of the self-society tension in no way necessarily entails "adjusting" to the society, much less "selling out"—although many youths see it this way. On the contrary, individuation refers partly to a psychological process whereby self and society are differentiated internally. But the actual conflicts between men and women and their societies remain, and indeed may even become more intense. (p. 642)

In a Sullivanian tone, Keniston traces interpersonal development from parity to complementarity to the mutuality of youth (p. 643). In an Eriksonian moment, he claims that in youth the individual faces the danger of estrangement from herself or her society, stating that "we can define the central developmental possibilities of youth as individuation vs. alienation" (p. 643).

While Kohlberg's ascription of a particular content to post-conventional morality is not in keeping with the notion of a self-chosen, autonomous system of values, the idea embodied in the concept of a stage beyond the acceptance of the dominant ideology of family or society is central to the notion of synthetic narcissism. Periods in which synthetically narcissistic processes emerge are existential, in the sense that the person lacks a set of assumptions upon which to base values, ideals, and a sense of meaning. The person who has established some degree of synthetic narcissism is, of course, never entirely free of unconscious and more primitive injunctions and ideal self-images, though she has gained some degree of autonomy over many of these early internalizations and no longer accepts internalized and societal moral beliefs and decrees as her own simply because they were issued by seemingly omnipotent authorities.

Synthetic narcissism represents a pinnacle of psychic differentiation. Theorists of moral development have failed to note that the inability to separate the moral values of parents and society from one's own is a problem in differentiation, an inadequate distinction between self and

other. Synthetic narcissism involves a differentiation between the moral views of self and significant others, an ability to separate "mine" from "thine" in the realm of values. It does not, however, represent a pseudo-independence, a defense against primitive fears of intimacy or merger. It rests upon the recognition that values do not inhere in the universe but are created, and that one needs some vantage point from which to adjudicate legitimate competing desires of oneself and others.

The content of the synthetically narcissistic ego ideal may range from *predominant* self-orientation to *predominant* other-orientation, but it is bounded on the one side by devaluation of the self, and on the other, by the devaluation of others. The content is also not likely to be stagnant, and as the individual ages, assumes new roles, undergoes new experiences, and is faced with old and often unknown conflicts from the past evoked in new situations, the content is likely to change.

Synthetic narcissism represents an alternative view of moral autonomy to that derived from Kant and Rousseau, and embodied in current approaches to moral psychology. Kant proposed that the categorical imperative is an a priori morality mandated by reason. Curiously, this a priori morality is a philosophized version of the morality Kant's parents and society instilled in him. Indeed, the morality that Kant's "autonomous" individual must obey is not a priori at all: it is a *dependence*. The child internalizes his parents' morality not, as Kant argues, because he is rational, but because his rationality is only poorly developed, because he mistakenly takes his parents or society for gods. Would a "rational" human being really accept the doctrine that to himself he should be just one more person among many, that he should treat himself just as he treats everyone else because he, like they, are rational beings? Such a view, one might argue, demonstrates a *lack* of adequate "reality-testing" or reason: to ourselves we are not *e pluribus unum*, we are not just another face an objective observer would miss in a crowd.

Kohlberg, like Kant, speaks of moral autonomy as the choosing and willing upon oneself of a moral code. While the notion of a truly post-conventional morality makes sense, Kohlberg errs, just as Kant does, in trying to prescribe what the content of that moral code must be. For Rousseau, Kant, Piaget, and Kohlberg, an individual who produces a moral system contrary to theirs is reasoning incorrectly and acting heteronomously. Psychoanalysis, too, shares some of these assumptions about moral autonomy. The child becomes morally autonomous when he has internalized parental prohibitions, at which point "the ego submits to the categorical imperative of its super-ego" (1933, p. 38). Freud recognized throughout his career that the superego is often primitive and a source of misery to the individual, yet he could never quite formulate a path beyond superego morality. Social learning theory describes mechanisms to account

for conformity to social standards, but it lacks an explanation for either rebellion or creativity, moral or otherwise.

Synthetic narcissism offers an alternative conception of moral autonomy that avoids allegedly "scientific" or "rational" prescription of a universal ethics. I would suggest that moral philosophy abandon the attempt to uncover a priori moral principles through supposedly rational inquiry, and instead examine the *method* of formation of moral beliefs in order to understand the possibilities and limits of moral autonomy.

The reader may wonder, if one does not prescribe a set of allegedly mature moral beliefs, what is to prevent the "synthetic narcissist" from being a mass-murderer. I have argued that the content of the synthetically narcissistic ego ideal cannot be determined a priori. Content, however, is constrained by form. The first form of the ego ideal involves the inability to perceive others as legitimate, and the second form denies independent legitimacy to the self. The content of the third form, synthetic narcissism, is bounded by these two extremes. Synthetically narcissistic processes entail, by definition, a valuing of both self and others as ends in themselves. The particular balance between these two valuations, however, is indeterminate and varies by individual, culture, and historical era. Synthetically narcissistic value systems may be largely self-oriented or predominantly other-oriented, but pure self- or other-orientation is a point they cannot reach without regression to a previous ego ideal synthesis. Maturity of object relations entails the recognition and valuation of others' existence as well as one's own. Murderous and indiscriminate rage based on infantile experience and fantasy empirically does not correlate with maturity of object relations and ego development.

Before concluding, it is important to bear in mind the conception of "stage" underlying the developmental model offered here. Stages are waves of processes, methods of fulfilling certain functions which crest and recede. "Pure" examples of the ideal types of internal, external, and synthetic narcissism obviously never exist. An unalloyed synthetic narcissism, for example, would involve the working through of every facet of one's conception of good and bad developed throughout early life and beyond. The pure case thus represents something of an upper bound which one may asymptotically approach. While some core of an integrated ego ideal may be unitary, remnants of past syntheses obviously persist, as archaic schemas and their corresponding affects are evoked by various thoughts and experiences.

One should also bear in mind that the stages described here are comprised of complex sets of processes, not single processes or functions, involving cognition, social cognition, self-representation, affective arousal and management, and the holding of values and ideals. I have described the development of this congeries of processes as personality development,

subsuming within that term the development of narcissism and object relations, moral judgment, and ego processes. From another vantage point, one may do well to try to disentangle the various processes to get a clearer picture of their interrelated yet distinguishable developmental trajectories. I have painted in thin, broad strokes, but am asserting that one may find in this canvas the potential for a more colorful portrait.

### Conclusion

To justify adoption of a new theory, one must be able to show, first and foremost, that the proposed view is more congruent with observable data, is more internally consistent, and/or is more economical than previous theories. These chapters have been in part comparative, pointing to deficiencies in other views, but they have not been systematically so. I hope to provide a more thorough summary and critique of the major approaches to personality at a later date. The assumption behind the eclecticism underlying the present work is that previous approaches have a great deal to offer, but none is adequate for the task of integrating current research and clinical understanding.

Apart from the question of the relative merits of this approach versus other views of personality in dealing with various research and clinical findings, the present perspective has four advantages. First, this approach allows an integration of theoretical understandings derived from clinical experience as well as more verifiable empirical work from the laboratory. The approach presented here not only synthesizes a number of theoretical perspectives, but it relies upon both clinical and experimental data. My own view is that the two are complementary and equally valid sources of information. Verification is obviously less problematic with replicable laboratory experiments, and when an important phenomenon can be tested experimentally it is imperative to do so instead of relying on one's beliefs or unsystematic observations. One should not, however, underestimate the extent to which the use of ideas by a community of clinicians is a selection process that weeds out concepts without much utility or those that do not explain the data of clinical observation.

While psychoanalytic psychologists tend to ignore important sources of empirical data, academic psychologists largely hold an outdated nineteenth century view of science which posits that accumulating "facts" and sticking them all in a textbook constitutes knowledge, and that one can test entire theories experimentally and therefore choose between them on strictly empirical grounds. Unfortunately, philosophers of science have abandoned this naive brand of positivism that does not even accord with the experience of the natural sciences which these psychologists are trying to emulate. A paradigm of personality that can be corroborated or discon-

firmed with a few well-designed experiments cannot have broad application to significant phenomena. One can test various aspects of a paradigm and either refine them, conclude that they explain the data well enough, or decide that one must search for a more accurate or useful general approach, but as Kuhn (1970) has made so clear, the fate of a broad theoretical approach does not rest upon isolated anomalies, which face every paradigm.

A useful distinction made by philosophers of science is between the context of discovery, in which new approaches are developed, and the context of justification, in which they are put to empirical test. Experimental techniques are far more convincing in the context of justification, but they are of limited utility in trying to formulate a broad theory of human mental processes and behavior. Relying solely upon networks of studies that sample thirty-minute slices of behavior of usually homogeneous populations through questionnaires or experimental procedures to guide one in formulating a gestalt of personality is comparable to examining with a microscope fifty one-millimeter sections of the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel and attempting to piece together what Michelangelo was trying to portray.

What generally happens is that the psychologist scaffolded six inches from the ceiling with his microscope will inform his understanding of the whole by sneaking an occasional glance from his idiosyncratic perspective. In other words, he will draw from his microscopic studies, but he will primarily fall back upon his own life experience as a source of more general assumptions or hypotheses. Researchers who study self-concepts come upon the idea of the existence and importance of them through introspection. Because such concepts are not observable, they would probably not have been discovered experimentally. When Fiske (1981) draws upon the "old flame phenomenon," she is drawing from personal experience; when Little (1983) models human behavior after the process of publishing an article, he is clearly gaining his understanding of motivation and action from his own life; when academic psychologists construct theories about the centrality of feelings of competence or control they do so ones about the centrality of feelings of competence or control they do so first by looking inward and only secondarily by peering outward.

In other words, while in the context of justification experimentalists gain fuller understanding by examining large samples, in the context of discovery they rely primarily upon a sample of one, bolstered, of course, by their knowledge of various research traditions. Thus, while the research psychologist has the edge in the context of justification, the clinician who observes the most intimate personal experiences, longitudinally and in depth, of many people other than himself, has the broader data base in the context of discovery. I suspect that the farther psychology moves from a stimulus-response approach, the more professionals of the field will come



to recognize that we cannot limit ourselves to quantifiable accounts of relatively simple phenomena built upon implicit assumptions derived from idiosyncratic experience, and that the findings of clinicians who daily encounter the deep structures of meaning and dynamic processes of concrete individuals are, though less verifiable than experimental evidence, not only admissible but essential as sources of data and theory-building.

Secondly, the present theory provides a more sophisticated account of the relation between thoughts and feelings than previous approaches and can accommodate both cognitive and dynamic explanations. A simple example is in the oft-noted tendency of people to ignore information discrepant from their schemas. Clearly this stems in part from the nature of human information-processing: new data are assimilated into existing schemas, so that information less expected is less easily perceived. Yet one should also note that the presence of information that conflicts with one's ways of thinking can also be very threatening and anxiety-provoking, so that ignoring discrepant data can be reinforced, i.e., defensively motivated. My own understanding of personality was initially primarily psychodynamic, and when I began reading Bandura's work, I had to fight my impulse at every step of the way to toss it aside as rubbish. My life would have been much easier at the time if it had, in fact, been rubbish. Unfortunately, sinister fellow that he is, Bandura had to disappoint me by being articulate. The result was that I was faced with conflicting schemas, and the reader must judge for herself or himself whether the schema I have constructed to gain a better understanding (cognitive explanation) and to allay my anxiety (dynamic explanation) has some utility or is grossly distorted by either cognitive error or dynamic pressure.

Motley's research on the experimental production of slips of the tongue demonstrates beyond doubt that such errors can result from either cognitive or dynamic interference. One can similarly reinterpret a whole host of phenomenon observed by cognitive social psychologists, such as self-serving biases in attributions (Greenwald, 1980), or contradictory evidence on the impact of negative mood states on behavior (Clarke and Isen, 1982), by considering motivational and cognitive factors in combination.

Sadly, the discipline has for years been largely polarized between those who feel compelled to deny any impact of dynamic processes and those who ascribe motivational significance to every act. For example, in their interesting book on social inference and its shortcomings, Nisbett and Ross (1980) downplay the possibility that people could deliberately keep thoughts or wishes from awareness, arguing that "what is unconscious is normally unconscious for the simplest of reasons: People lack the machinery for bringing the relevant facts into conscious purview" (p. 245). The model of human nature informing their work is that people are like "intuitive scientists" or "intuitive psychologists" (Ross, 1977) who form

hypotheses, test them through their experience, and frequently come to incorrect conclusions because of faulty experimental design or inference.

Yet if one really wishes to pursue the intuitive science metaphor, one should correct the idealized and distorted image of science that underlies it. Scientists and psychologists do indeed form and test hypotheses and make cognitive errors, yet they also falsify data, pour out meaningless studies in the quest for tenure, divide decent articles into several papers to increase their stack of publications, list themselves as first author on publications in collaboration with struggling younger colleagues who may have done most of the work, write scathing critiques of colleagues' work out of personal enmity, collapse variables in "legal" but dubious ways to attain significance, favorably cite the work of probable reviewers in articles they would like published, jockey for power in academic committees, make passes at attractive students currently in their classes or under their control, imagine themselves the greatest researcher in their profession, wear lab coats to make themselves feel like scientists, give students unconsciously low grades to satisfy sadistic impulses—the list goes on, and I will stop before revealing my own favorite vices.

Human beings are creatures who both think and feel, and any theory that begins with the assumption of the primacy of either cognition or dynamics can only be a partial theory. It is a pity that we, like Oedipus, seem compelled to blind ourselves in the face of information we do not wish to believe. Unlike Oedipus, however, we tend to gouge out only one eye while being unaware of our monocular vision, convinced that we are seeing things in proper perspective. I am arguing that we must keep one eye on cognition, one on affect and dynamics, and integrate the two impressions to form a coherent single image. We will always be blind to data on the periphery of our understanding, but we can at least be certain that we are seeing in depth.

Thirdly, a good theory must be able to guide research, and the avenues of exploration generated or accommodated by the theory proposed here are many. For example, while I have argued for a general process of ego development, one can delineate a nearly infinite number of developmental lines, such as the development of affect and specific affects, cognition and specific cognitive processes, social cognition (including social causality, person perception, social reasoning, understanding of social rules, and understanding of affect and motivation), object relations, control mechanisms and specific coping or defensive processes, self-schemas, ideal self-images, moral beliefs, psychosexual phenomena, and generalized and specific set-goals. Many of these have, of course, been studied at considerable length through the years. The advantage of the current approach is that they may now be housed under one theoretical roof.

The theory also suggests directions for empirical studies of interactions



between many of these processes, such as affect, cognition, and affect regulation. For example, efficient mechanisms of emotional regulation are unlikely to develop while affect remains global and overwhelming. This relies both upon strictly affective development as well as on the emergence of the cognitive capacity to form expectancies about the probable outcome of various control mechanisms and to attribute and isolate causes of distress. Any faulty link in a complex chain—from perception and cognition of stimulus, to affect, to attribution of causes and quality of affect, to efficiency of control mechanisms—may lead to psychic dysfunction. Not only can poor cognitive processing lead, for example, to inappropriate affect, which can cause primitive defensive functioning, but low level defenses generally distort cognition, leading to a circle of pathology. Similarly, Damon (1977) has found that the maturity of children's responses to questions about fairness decreases when the candy to share is in sight, and psychoanalytic experience leads one to believe that affect can often disrupt mature cognitive functioning.

A fourth advantage, and from a practical perspective probably the most important, is that the theory holds out the promise of aiding in some limited way in our understanding of psychopathology and processes of therapeutic change. One of the main advantages in this regard is that it may provide a theoretical underpinning for psychodynamic psychotherapists who find Freud's clinical theory valuable but reject psychoanalytic metapsychology (for the distinction between clinical theory and metapsychology in psychoanalysis, see the volume edited by Gill and Holzman, 1976). It may also help in effecting a rapprochement between psychodynamic psychotherapists, counselors (the majority of whom are primarily influenced by Rogers), and cognitive-behavioral clinicians. Psychodynamically oriented clinicians often view the work of the latter two groups as dealing with surface phenomena instead of with the roots of psychic problems, whereas counselors and cognitive and behaviorally oriented clinicians often criticize psychodynamic psychotherapists for reducing every problem to an infantile sexual conflict.

Both are sometimes right, and those mental health professionals who come into contact with serious pathology as well as momentary problems of living often find themselves, especially when working with children and their families, flipping from one paradigm to another in the course of a day or even a therapy session. The approach proposed here may ultimately provide a more integrated perspective. With the exception of a few random examples, I have avoided in this work any systematic application of the theory to psychopathology since I lack either the extensive clinical experience required for such a task or the hubris to embark upon it without enough experience. I will therefore leave this to more experienced and

knowledgeable clinicians and perhaps to myself years hence when I have accumulated more experience, more hubris, or both.

A final advantage of the theory presented here is that it can, as the remainder of the book will attempt to show, be integrated into a general social scientific model that allows one to transcend artificial and often limiting disciplinary boundaries. One cannot understand the structure, dynamics, and development of personality entirely in isolation from sociocultural structure, dynamics, and change. The examination of these sociocultural phenomena is the task to which Part II now turns.